On policy analysis (Iran strikes)

Some analysts fall into certain traps, but policy is much more complicated than some make it seem.

Things like this are more obvious to some than to others, and separating oneself from policy analysis, which is crucial to analysis, comes easier to some than to others.

The point of this is that it's a trap some analysts fall into where they're more advocates than analysts and have trouble separating what they'd like to see from what is likely.

Another trap is that military folks sometimes view a scenario in a purely military context, absent the surrounding policy preferences, objectives, economic, and political factors.

It's getting to a point where trotting out my namesake's "war is the continuation of policy by other means" is turning into a tired old trope, but it's as true now as it was in the early 19th century when vom Krieg was published.

Yes, absent all these factors, looking only at pure capabilities, the US can unexistify Iran if it chooses to. this however doesn't mean that it wouldn't come at a significant cost or that Iran doesn't have considerable capabilities for retaliating asymmetrically, but that said, it cannot be stressed enough, despite how some people present it. Iran is not a peer to the US. There is no universe in which Iran is a peer to the US at present, but it doesn’t need to be, because none of this is taking place in a vacuum.

There are a few factors here, the US cannot dedicate the entirety of its combat ability to Iran, so considering the totality of its forces is irrelevant. Doing so would necessarily require pulling forces from elsewhere, which invites fuckery from other parties. For instance, while I don’t believe that The People's Republic of China intends to take Waiwan by force, and certainly not in the short term, it does appear to be a prevailing narrative in American policy circles, and pulling forces from elsewhere needs to be taken in mind with that context. Likewise, all the carrier groups currently on deployment are deployed for a reason, we have to take in mind what potential impact there is by moving them elsewhere.

The whole point of this kerfuffle is that it's in retaliation for the 3 dead American servicemen, but that's part of the greater picture of over 170 attacks on US positions throughout the region -- it's quite clear that these are precariously vulnerable positions which would be struck in retaliation, and with more firepower than any of these proxies or associates can muster. That would obviously be bad, and would obviously be something the admin would like to avoid.

Further, given the Red Sea, as we can see, turning it into a full-on combat zone has worsened the situation, in terms of maritime trade. A war on Iran also risks disrupting transit through the straits of Hormuz, where about 21 million bbl/day or ~20% of global liquid petrol consumption, passes through.

What does this do for global trade? What does it do to oil prices? Can I assume we're all caught up after the past year on the relation between fuel and transport prices, and the impact of transport prices on the costs for everything else, for instance, the ongoing cost of living crisis? Who benefits from spiraling oil prices? I can think of at least one energy giant and a handful of partners who resell a certain country's oil.

Then there's the domestic politics to consider, it's an election year, and starting a new war might work against the current administration. If this was a second term, the administration might be less reticent to potentially initiate another 20-year quagmire (which compounds all the above), and yes, while the US can unexistify Iran if it chooses, this was also true of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Further, do we really want to initiate a rally around the flag effect in Iran, given that we’re supporting anti-regime dissidents in the country?

It's quite clear that it's neither in American nor Iranian interests to go to direct war, but yet... And the argument we heard a lot going into this is going after the Iranian nuclear program "We can't let them have nukes!" but this is confused messaging. On one hand, it implies that they'd be fine with the nuclear program if not for the death of 3 Americans, on the other, it betrays using this as an excuse to go after the nuclear program (because this has nothing to do with the nuclear program), which is curious when you consider that it's the anti “might makes right” crowd that tends to push this.

Another factor to consider is Hizballah. A common argument for why this group won’t fully commit to the conflict in Gaza is because it’s Iran’s baby, the crown jewel among its proxies, and Tehran would prefer to not risk its destruction. This is a strong argument. The question is, what if there’s nothing left for Iran to lose, let’s say because it’s in a full-on war with the United States? While the US has to respond here, this works both ways, and we have to consider what action Iran would be forced to respond to.

It's confused, arguably self-undermining, messaging, and it sets an awful precedent of going after the benefactor for actions of loose proxies or affiliated groups -- think of who else uses proxies, think of who would be launching these attacks, specifically, who also uses proxies. Then there's establishing a precedent of striking at home for what would otherwise be considered salami tactics on forward positions.

Moreover, this is a prime example of confusing what one wants to see and what is a realistic policy option. Then there's the talk of "re-establishing deterrence" which sounds nice, but there are caveats of deterrence, limits to it. You're an occupying force in this region, there's only so far deterrence goes in that context, as well as when strategic interests are concerned.

That all being said, given the deaths of servicemen, the US had to respond, but expecting another forever war over it is... Not a good analysis.

This whole ordeal is a lot more complicated than some would present it as, and there are dozens of additional variables I'm not addressing here. Be wary of those who push policies but don't consider consequences. Now consider all of the above within the context of partners, allies, and other parties, and we have hundreds of additional variables to consider.

tl;dr politics matter, economics matter, conflict doesn't happen in a vacuum, and analysts sometimes fail to account for consequences.