Lots of slop hype pieces where every weapons system is a “game changer”, sometimes they catch my eye, and I feel compelled to respond to them. I collect them here. Unfortunately, the posts these write-ups are prompted by get deleted (because slop merchants are slop merchants).
Helios / Directed-Energy Missile Defence
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Helios wasn’t “supposed to stay classified for another decade” it’s been known to the public for years, even before it was deployed on the USS Preble in 2022 [0].
There are some caveats with it; it’s only deployed on one ship, the Preble, an Arleigh Burke Flight IIA class. The Burke is poorly suited for DEWs, it doesn’t have the spare power to utilise both Helios and its radar at the same time.
Per Rear Admiral Boxall, either something needs to be removed (from the Burke), or the navy needs to look into “very aggressive power management” [1]. There are only three non-carrier surface combatants well suited for this kind of platform, and those are the three hulls that came out of the (cancelled in ‘08) Zumwalt class.
There are also limitations to DEWs, and counter-measures are well-known; reflective or absorptive coatings, smoke, fog, aerosols (anything that causes diffraction) which accelerates thermal blooming or disrupt beam coherence, active cooling, will ramp up energy costs. Also, most simply, manoeuvrability, as laser weapons need dwell time on the target.
These are well-known limitations, and are why HELIOS is positioned as a complementary component within a layered air defence grid, rather than a standalone Wonderwaffle.
The Shahed is also not “perfected to” blah blah blah, the whole point is that it’s a cheap, low-tech, flying moped (literally!) with a warhead attached.
While the cost-per-shot is often touted, and it is impressive, it also obscures the cost of the system; $150 to almost a billion depending on configuration [2], and that’s without factoring the the ship and power generation needed to power it (Zumwalt costed ~$4-8 billion per unit, depending on if we spread R&D costs across the 3 that were built, or the 32 that were supposed to be built) [3]. Units costs are ~$1.9-2.2 billion for Arleigh Burke Flight IIa and Flight III.
Plus, cheap drones in large enough swarms still saturate tracking systems.
Because it wouldn’t be a war college/academy post without silly math, and we amortise platform costs into per-shot costs.
Burke + initial, lowest cost package = $2.15 billion.
Median Shahed cost estimate at 30k.
At 10,000 shots fired, that’s $215,000 per shot.
But assuming one-shot one kill, that’s still only $300 million worth of flying mopeds.
HELIOS on a Burke Flight IIa would require downing 71,666 Shaheeds to trade evenly.
5,000 moped kills for the system itself to trade even, at the lowest cost configuration, ~31,000 at the full/complete $940m configuration. For full contrast, $15,000/shot and $94,000/shot at 10k shots, for lowest and highest end configurations.
Sadly, MDEV math doesn’t work for systems with theoretically infinite magazine depth, so no MDEV or MDES. tl;dr pennies per shot if we ignore platform procurement and lifecycle costs for the boat it’s attached to.
DEWs are undeniably cool, and have utility within a layered system, but let’s not overhype or pretend that they’re not horrendously expensive systems.
[0] https://seapowermagazine.org/helios-laser-weapon-system-delivered-for-installation-on-uss-preble/
[1] https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44175.pdf
[2] https://naval-technology.com/features/navy-laser-weapon-systems/?cf-view
[3] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navys-zumwalt-class-destroyer-245-billion-failure-213132
The STING Anti-Drone System
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While STING is certainly cool, absolutely innovative, and undoubtedly and impressive cost-effective trade against Geran, as always, there are some caveats.
Aside from the minutia (these aren’t new, production began circa May 2025 [1], and they cost about $2000-2500 per unit). They are remotely piloted via VR headsets [1], which means three important limitations:
1) Probably not a great counter for large enough swarms, as each one requires a pilot.
2) The human element places a hard limit on scalability.
3) Remote piloting means its vulnerable to jamming.
None of these are insurmountable, making them fully autonomous solves all of these.
3,900 drones downed with these since ~May 2025 [2], and that certainly looks impressive in isolation, but we have to consider the sheer scale of Russian Geran launches; 130-200 a day on average, as high as 400+ on some days, and with Ukrainian and US estimates of a capacity to potentially sustain many more a day, eventually. [3][4]. Range is also relatively short, with pilots having about 10 minutes upon notification before incoming is out of range [4].
That 3,900 translates to 19.5 to 30 days worth of Gerans at the lower estimate. Certainly impressive, but it’s over ~300 days. This isn’t to underplay Sting’s utility, every Geran it downs is a Geran that doesn’t reach its target or one less more expensive countermeasure trading poorly, but it’s to illustrate the hard cap placed on scalability by the human element of the platform.
As with most things, definitely effective as a component of a multi-layered AD grid, but the hype should be metered until they’re fully autonomous and more resistant to jamming, assuming those improvements don’t obliviate the cost ratios.
Not everything is a world-shattering changer of games, even the genuinely innovative stuff.
[1]: https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukrainian-vr-piloted-sting-drone-takes-out-shahed-uav-in-first-ever-recorded-strike-video-8514
[2]: https://cbsnews.com/news/us-ukraine-drone-defense-expertise-iran-war/
[3]: https://kyivindependent.com/exclusive-ukraine-could-face-500-russian-drones-a-night-as-kremlin-builds-new-launch-sites/
[4]: https://cbsnews.com/news/us-ukraine-drone-defense-expertise-iran-war/
The A-10 “Warthog”
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One more of these, I suppose. The A-10 is certainly a formidable CAS fighter, though one with a bit of a cult following. Spoiler: its deployment doesn't "change everything", it doesn't change anything, and even reinforces the status quo, but more on that later.
"It was built to destroy Soviet tank columns in 72 hours.”
The oft-quoted 72 hours isn't the time to mission completion, it's the attritional half-life for the A-10 in its intended mission of retarding Warsaw Pact armour columns crossing choke points like the Fulda Gap, in the event of a full-on conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Attritional half-life estimate, meaning the timeframe for half of the fleet to be lost. The most common retelling is an estimated 7% attrition per 100 sorties.
That adds up very quickly, especially since once losses start piling up, airframes have to go on more and more sorties to offset. Fleet of 700 would entail 2800 sorties (4/day per airframe), and ~196 losses. Compound that over 72 hours, and half the fleet is gone. [1]
Of course, such high losses would have to be coupled with potential for high reward if it were deployed, and the GAU-8's damage assessment corroborates as much, but with some caveats.
The assessment was based on a test involving clear skies allowing for full visibility and unlimited altitude, 10 stationary M-47 with their engines running in open, flat, desert, no cover or concealment. 10 minute and 30 second strafing runs at low altitude and dive angles; two pilots, 23 passes each at a primary target. Projectile impacts on 23 primary, 10 secondary, and 5 incidental tanks. 1969 rounds fired in 23 bursts, resulting in 347 impacts (17.6%) including 50 perforations (14% of impacts). Non penetrating shots did damage exterior tracks and suspension components, as well as optics. 6 catastrophic kills, 3 mission-killed (immobile and unable to fire). Penetrations were mainly in the sides and rear of the tanks; frontal armour was apparently sufficient to withstand direct hits. [2]
Yes, the 10s is a flying gun with a titanium bathtub attached to it to house the pilot, renowned for its ability to eat MANPADs and small arms fire to the face and fly back to base, again a formidable dedicated CAS fighter with only the lighter Su-25 Grach in the same class. Grach trades some armour and gun calibre for speed and manoeuvrability in the name of survivability in less permissive airspace. But anything larger than man-portable or small arms, say, SAMs or enemy fighters is going to be a bad day for the pilot and airframe.
That's the bottom line with the A-10. Utterly devastating to ground forces when full-spectrum air domination is achieved, or it has SEAD/DEAD and fighter escorts, but the efficacy drops off substantially when airspace is contested or interdicted.
This is why the deployment of the A-10 changes nothing and reinforces the status quo; if the Warthogs are out, it means air superiority has been achieved already. It's expected to be sent in for ground clean-up in permissible airspace.
"And you only send them in when you've already decided the ground war is INEVITABLE."
Literal rubbish. You send them in to support boots on the ground or when there are ground targets in need of killing, and mainly in permissive airspace.
And let's be real, Iran's air force is negligible, Tomcats, Phantom IIs, and Yak trainers aren't going to contest F-35s, F-15s, or F-22s, and Iran's AD grid had been severely degraded in the 12-day war with little chance to recover. Fighters were flying over Tehran unimpeded ffs.
Same story in Iraq, uncontested air space, most of the air force popped early, and SEAD/DEAD to deal with IAD allowed for Warthogs to lay waste to armour in open flatlands unimpeded.
Again, formidable CAS platform, worthy of the memes and it indeed goes BRRRT but not some invincible game changing magical wonderwaffle. The main signal of a potential ground incursion isn't early A-10 deployment in uncontested airspace, but the USS Tripoli accompanied by the 31st MEU and 2,500 Marines heading into the theatre of operations [3], but even this doesn't signal inevitability.
This is status quo, and expected sequence of events. Not every development "changes everything about the war".
[1]: https://web.archive.org/web/20130223053403/http://www.warisboring.com/2013/01/21/
life-expectancy-of-a-cold-war-a-10-pilot/
[2]: https://archive.org/details/combatdamageasse006stol/page/2/mode/2up
[3]: https://upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/03/13/world-tripoli-more-marines-head-to-middle-east/6301773437271/
note on source [1], it references a now impossible to find Combat Aircraft Magazine piece in turn referencing 1980s USAF planning estimates.