Though the US has been burning through an inordinate number of high value munitions, and doing so at a rate faster than it can replace them, Iran isn't and has never been in a position where it can grind down or attrit the US, never mind win kinetically.

The US isn't in a position where it can't just come back and start bombing again.

It's most potentially effective option has always been asymmetric cost imposition, but that requires being able to hold out long enough to keep a functional blockade up (regardless of who is imposing it) long enough to strain and potentially deplete the reserves of Gulf-dependent East Asian states, and stress the deficit tolerance of Gulf exporters.

afaik Japan and RoK have ~200 days in SPR. China isn't in immediate danger either.

Singapore, India, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Pakistan are all potentially exposed with 20-70 days of reserves. though some, like Singapore have more options than others.

But there are countermeasures in play; the UAE can move 1.5-1.8 mil bbl/day through its bypass pipeline and the expansion is 50% built. KSA can move 4.7-5 mil bbl/day through Yanbu (and can potentially increase loading capacity).

This of course doesn't offset export disruptions completely, but it does extend how long Iran would need to keep a blockade going, and there are still deep strategic reserves in play that can still be released to stabilize prices.

Whether they can hold out long enough remains to be seen, but oil leverage through disruption potential seems to be something they’re keenly aware of.

Helios / Directed-Energy Missile Defence

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Helios wasn’t “supposed to stay classified for another decade” it’s been known to the public for years, even before it was deployed on the USS Preble in 2022 [0].

There are some caveats with it; it’s only deployed on one ship, the Preble, an Arleigh Burke Flight IIA class. The Burke is poorly suited for DEWs, it doesn’t have the spare power to utilise both Helios and its radar at the same time.

Per Rear Admiral Boxall, either something needs to be removed (from the Burke), or the navy needs to look into “very aggressive power management” [1]. There are only three non-carrier surface combatants well suited for this kind of platform, and those are the three hulls that came out of the (cancelled in ‘08) Zumwalt class.

There are also limitations to DEWs, and counter-measures are well-known; reflective or absorptive coatings, smoke, fog, aerosols (anything that causes diffraction) which accelerates thermal blooming or disrupt beam coherence, active cooling, will ramp up energy costs. Also, most simply, manoeuvrability, as laser weapons need dwell time on the target.

These are well-known limitations, and are why HELIOS is positioned as a complementary component within a layered air defence grid, rather than a standalone Wonderwaffle.

The Shahed is also not “perfected to” blah blah blah, the whole point is that it’s a cheap, low-tech, flying moped (literally!) with a warhead attached.

While the cost-per-shot is often touted, and it is impressive, it also obscures the cost of the system; $150 to almost a billion depending on configuration [2], and that’s without factoring the the ship and power generation needed to power it (Zumwalt costed ~$4-8 billion per unit, depending on if we spread R&D costs across the 3 that were built, or the 32 that were supposed to be built) [3]. Units costs are ~$1.9-2.2 billion for Arleigh Burke Flight IIa and Flight III.

Plus, cheap drones in large enough swarms still saturate tracking systems.

Because it wouldn’t be a war college/academy post without silly math, and we amortise platform costs into per-shot costs.

Burke + initial, lowest cost package = $2.15 billion.

Median Shahed cost estimate at 30k.

At 10,000 shots fired, that’s $215,000 per shot.

But assuming one-shot one kill, that’s still only $300 million worth of flying mopeds.

HELIOS on a Burke Flight IIa would require downing 71,666 Shaheeds to trade evenly.

5,000 moped kills for the system itself to trade even, at the lowest cost configuration, ~31,000 at the full/complete $940m configuration. For full contrast, $15,000/shot and $94,000/shot at 10k shots, for lowest and highest end configurations.

Sadly, MDEV math doesn’t work for systems with theoretically infinite magazine depth, so no MDEV or MDES. tl;dr pennies per shot if we ignore platform procurement and lifecycle costs for the boat it’s attached to.

DEWs are undeniably cool, and have utility within a layered system, but let’s not overhype or pretend that they’re not horrendously expensive systems.

[0] https://seapowermagazine.org/helios-laser-weapon-system-delivered-for-installation-on-uss-preble/

[1] https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44175.pdf

[2] https://naval-technology.com/features/navy-laser-weapon-systems/?cf-view

[3] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navys-zumwalt-class-destroyer-245-billion-failure-213132

The STING Anti-Drone System

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While STING is certainly cool, absolutely innovative, and undoubtedly and impressive cost-effective trade against Geran, as always, there are some caveats.

Aside from the minutia (these aren’t new, production began circa May 2025 [1], and they cost about $2000-2500 per unit). They are remotely piloted via VR headsets [1], which means three important limitations:

1) Probably not a great counter for large enough swarms, as each one requires a pilot.
2) The human element places a hard limit on scalability.
3) Remote piloting means its vulnerable to jamming.

None of these are insurmountable, making them fully autonomous solves all of these.

3,900 drones downed with these since ~May 2025 [2], and that certainly looks impressive in isolation, but we have to consider the sheer scale of Russian Geran launches; 130-200 a day on average, as high as 400+ on some days, and with Ukrainian and US estimates of a capacity to potentially sustain many more a day, eventually. [3][4]. Range is also relatively short, with pilots having about 10 minutes upon notification before incoming is out of range [4].

That 3,900 translates to 19.5 to 30 days worth of Gerans at the lower estimate. Certainly impressive, but it’s over ~300 days. This isn’t to underplay Sting’s utility, every Geran it downs is a Geran that doesn’t reach its target or one less more expensive countermeasure trading poorly, but it’s to illustrate the hard cap placed on scalability by the human element of the platform.

As with most things, definitely effective as a component of a multi-layered AD grid, but the hype should be metered until they’re fully autonomous and more resistant to jamming, assuming those improvements don’t obliviate the cost ratios.

Not everything is a world-shattering changer of games, even the genuinely innovative stuff.

[1]: https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukrainian-vr-piloted-sting-drone-takes-out-shahed-uav-in-first-ever-recorded-strike-video-8514
[2]: https://cbsnews.com/news/us-ukraine-drone-defense-expertise-iran-war/
[3]: https://kyivindependent.com/exclusive-ukraine-could-face-500-russian-drones-a-night-as-kremlin-builds-new-launch-sites/
[4]: https://cbsnews.com/news/us-ukraine-drone-defense-expertise-iran-war/

The A-10 “Warthog”

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One more of these, I suppose. The A-10 is certainly a formidable CAS fighter, though one with a bit of a cult following. Spoiler: its deployment doesn't "change everything", it doesn't change anything, and even reinforces the status quo, but more on that later.

"It was built to destroy Soviet tank columns in 72 hours.”

The oft-quoted 72 hours isn't the time to mission completion, it's the attritional half-life for the A-10 in its intended mission of retarding Warsaw Pact armour columns crossing choke points like the Fulda Gap, in the event of a full-on conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Attritional half-life estimate, meaning the timeframe for half of the fleet to be lost. The most common retelling is an estimated 7% attrition per 100 sorties.

That adds up very quickly, especially since once losses start piling up, airframes have to go on more and more sorties to offset. Fleet of 700 would entail 2800 sorties (4/day per airframe), and ~196 losses. Compound that over 72 hours, and half the fleet is gone. [1]

Of course, such high losses would have to be coupled with potential for high reward if it were deployed, and the GAU-8's damage assessment corroborates as much, but with some caveats.

The assessment was based on a test involving clear skies allowing for full visibility and unlimited altitude, 10 stationary M-47 with their engines running in open, flat, desert, no cover or concealment. 10 minute and 30 second strafing runs at low altitude and dive angles; two pilots, 23 passes each at a primary target. Projectile impacts on 23 primary, 10 secondary, and 5 incidental tanks. 1969 rounds fired in 23 bursts, resulting in 347 impacts (17.6%) including 50 perforations (14% of impacts). Non penetrating shots did damage exterior tracks and suspension components, as well as optics. 6 catastrophic kills, 3 mission-killed (immobile and unable to fire). Penetrations were mainly in the sides and rear of the tanks; frontal armour was apparently sufficient to withstand direct hits. [2]

Yes, the 10s is a flying gun with a titanium bathtub attached to it to house the pilot, renowned for its ability to eat MANPADs and small arms fire to the face and fly back to base, again a formidable dedicated CAS fighter with only the lighter Su-25 Grach in the same class. Grach trades some armour and gun calibre for speed and manoeuvrability in the name of survivability in less permissive airspace. But anything larger than man-portable or small arms, say, SAMs or enemy fighters is going to be a bad day for the pilot and airframe.

That's the bottom line with the A-10. Utterly devastating to ground forces when full-spectrum air domination is achieved, or it has SEAD/DEAD and fighter escorts, but the efficacy drops off substantially when airspace is contested or interdicted.

This is why the deployment of the A-10 changes nothing and reinforces the status quo; if the Warthogs are out, it means air superiority has been achieved already. It's expected to be sent in for ground clean-up in permissible airspace.

"And you only send them in when you've already decided the ground war is INEVITABLE."

Literal rubbish. You send them in to support boots on the ground or when there are ground targets in need of killing, and mainly in permissive airspace.

And let's be real, Iran's air force is negligible, Tomcats, Phantom IIs, and Yak trainers aren't going to contest F-35s, F-15s, or F-22s, and Iran's AD grid had been severely degraded in the 12-day war with little chance to recover. Fighters were flying over Tehran unimpeded ffs.

Same story in Iraq, uncontested air space, most of the air force popped early, and SEAD/DEAD to deal with IAD allowed for Warthogs to lay waste to armour in open flatlands unimpeded.

Again, formidable CAS platform, worthy of the memes and it indeed goes BRRRT but not some invincible game changing magical wonderwaffle. The main signal of a potential ground incursion isn't early A-10 deployment in uncontested airspace, but the USS Tripoli accompanied by the 31st MEU and 2,500 Marines heading into the theatre of operations [3], but even this doesn't signal inevitability.

This is status quo, and expected sequence of events. Not every development "changes everything about the war".

[1]: https://web.archive.org/web/20130223053403/http://www.warisboring.com/2013/01/21/
life-expectancy-of-a-cold-war-a-10-pilot/
[2]: https://archive.org/details/combatdamageasse006stol/page/2/mode/2up
[3]: https://upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/03/13/world-tripoli-more-marines-head-to-middle-east/6301773437271/

note on source [1], it references a now impossible to find Combat Aircraft Magazine piece in turn referencing 1980s USAF planning estimates.

Canadian wildfires have become a subject of increasingly confident claims. Climate change is blamed for worsening fires; forestry practices blamed for changing fuel loads; herbicides, particularly Glyphosate, have became a recurring subject of debate; and question about firefighting capacity inevitably follow every catastrophic fire season.

Some claims are well established. Others are plausible hypotheses. Some are difficult to distinguish from one another using datasets that are actually available.

This article is an attempt to interrogate those questions statistically.

It is not intended to produce a grand unified model of Canadian wildfires, nor to establish causal effects for every variable included in the analysis. The data is provincial and depending on the specification, annual or monthly. This data cannot capture every relevant feature of a wildfire landscape, and some variables are necessarily imperfect proxies for the things that we would ideally like to measure.

The interesting question isn’t whether a regression produces a statistically significant coefficient. It is what that coefficient actually represents, whether the model is capable of distinguishing competing explanations, and what happens when we change the way the problem is specified. This is not so much an article on Canadian wildfires using statistics, but rather an article about statistics, statistical modelling and analysis using Canadian wildfires as the case study.

As such, in this article, I’ll walk through the modelling process, rather than simply present the final results. Some variables that initially seemed useful turned out to introduce endogeneity. Annual aggregation obscured relationships that became much clearer at monthly granularity. In one particularly interesting case, a statistically significant relationship between glyphosate use and wildfire outcomes turned out to be a good demonstration of why statistical significance doesn’t tell us what the variable actually means.

The objective is less to discover a previously unknown theory of Canadian wildfire behaviour, and more to see what the data can reasonably tell us, what it cannot, and how easily an apparently convincing statistical result can be made to say more than the underlying data can justify.

Pre-emptive caveat

Before getting into it, It’s worth underscoring that while these are deliberately simple models using relatively accessible data, they are very early, preliminary steps in an iterative exploratory modelling process, rather than toy models deliberately constructed to highlight statistical pitfalls and traps.

You start simple and test the relatively straightforward options first. You run the models, interpret the results, and determine what works, what doesn’t, what is missing, and what would be required to address those gaps. You don’t skip straight to a massively complex spatial model with tens of millions of observations before establishing what the simpler models can tell you. With that being said…

Conceptual framework

The primary objective of this exercise is to quantify the structural, ecological, and climatic drivers of Canadian wildfire regimes. Specifically, it aims to isolate the factors governing ignition frequency (fire counts) and fire extent (area burned) across both natural and human-caused ignition sources to inform evidence-based forestry and suppression policy.

The core conceptual framework rests on a fundamental premise: ignitions do not equal extent. The variables that dictate whether a fire ignites (e.g. fine fuel moisture, atmospheric instability, human access) are distinct from those that govern whether an ignition escapes initial attack and expands into a mega-fire. Differentiating between natural and human ignition regimes is equally critical.

• Natural (lightning) regimes: driven by convective atmospheric instability and landscape-scale fuel dynamics across both managed and unmanaged wilderness.

• Human regimes: strictly tethered to human infrastructure, industrial operations, and recreational access. Humans cause fires where humans exist, not in isolated wilderness.

Using a 35-year panel dataset (1990-2024) across Canadian provinces and territories, I estimated Two-Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) regression models across four distinct target variables.

1. Natural area burned | area burned by naturally ignited fires.

2. Human area burned | area burned by human-ignited fires.

3. Natural fire counts | total number of nature-caused ignitions.

4. Human fire counts | total number of human-caused ignitions.

The two-way fixed effects model

1. Provincial Fixed Effects: accounts for permanent baseline differences between provinces (e.g. mountainous terrain in British Columbia as opposed to flatlands in the prairies).

2. Year Fixed Effects: accounts for nationwide annual weather events and climate trends that affect all provinces simultaneously.

Econometric specification

The TWFE framework absorbs unobserved heterogeneity through two dimensions:

Provincial fixed effects Controls for time-invariant baseline spatial differences between jurisdictions (e.g. mountainous topography in British Columbia versus flat prairie terrain or lake-dense Boreal Shield).

Year Fixed Effects: Controls for nationwide annual macroeconomic, climate, or synoptic weather shocks that affect all jurisdictions simultaneously.

Variable selection

• log_burned_natural: Log hectares burned by natural (lightning) ignitions.

• log_burned_human: Log hectares burned by human ignitions.

• log_num_natural: Log count of nature-caused fire ignitions.

• log_num_human: Log count of human-caused fire ignitions.

• Mean Temperature (mean_temp): captures macro thermal conditions. Higher temperatures increase vapour pressure, drying out forest fuels, while promoting unstable convective atmospheric conditions for lightning.

• Total Precipitation (total_precip): captures fuel moisture saturation, this is expected to suppress fire ignition, though the impact on large infernos is limited once fuels cross critical dryness thresholds.

• Mean Wind Speed (mean_wind_speed): contributes to fire spread.

• Current Insect Defoliation (log_insect_defol): insect outbreaks kill leaves and needles, creating abundant dry fuel first in the canopy, and later on the ground.

• 1-Year Lagged Insect Defoliation (log_insect_defol_lag1): attempts to capture multi-year canopy dynamics. By year two, dead leaves and needles should be on the ground, breaking the canopy ladder, but theoretically increasing spread on the ground.

• Ground Herbicides (log_herb_ground): ground-level vegetation management targets below-canopy brush, shrubs, and invasive growth. This includes glyphosate usage to address present discourse.

• Aerial Herbicides (log_herb_helicopter, log_herb_fixed_wing): typically deployed for dense, remote areas which carry heavy fuel loads. Includes glyphosate usage to address present discourse.

• Wood Supply / Harvest Volume (log_wood_supply): proxies active commercial harvesting, introduces access roads, and proxies human access.

• Lagged Targets (log_burned_*_lag1, log_num_*_lag1): Large fires alter fuel loads, open landscapes, and leave standing dead wood that influences ignition and spread in the following season. For human fires, lag terms capture structural persistence in human recreation and industrial access.

Omitted variables and Endogeneity constraints.

Suppression Mobilization Data: inter-provincial Mutual Aid Resource Sharing (MARS) statistics (aircraft, personnel, pumps) were omitted due to severe simultaneous endogeneity. Resource mobilization is a direct function of fire extent; high fire activity triggers increased resource sharing, creating a false positive correlation between suppression deployment and total area burned.

Budgetary metrics: Annual provincial suppression and forestry budgets (~470 budget documents across 13 jurisdictions and Parks Canada) were excluded. Budget-to-actual variance severely penalizes jurisdiction facing anomalous, black-swan fire seasons (ex. Quebec in 2023, Alberta in 2016). Instead, silvicultural treatments, commercial harvest volumes, and fleet assets serve as cleaner proxies for active preventative management.

Annual Model Results

The annual TWFE model yields high overall explanatory power but reveals stark divergences between ignition frequency and total burn acreage:

Standardized coefficients are calculated after within-province z-scoring of the dependent and independent variables. They therefore represent standardized within-province associations and are not conventional globally standardized coefficients.

What the models appear to show us

• Natural Area Burned: The natural-area model has a high R-squared of 0.8765, conventionally interpreted as the model “explaining” approximately 88% of the observed variance. The quotation marks are deliberate: R-squared describes how much variation is accounted for by the fitted model, not whether the included variables actually explain that variation causally.
  
  Mean temperature has a positive and statistically significant relationship with naturally burned area (raw coefficient = 0.2459, standardized β = 0.1269, p = 0.0248).The direction is consistent with the expected relationship between warmer conditions and wildfire activity, although perhaps tempting the coefficient should not be read as meaning that a 1°C increase produces a ~24.6% increase in burned area (despite what it suggests on the surface), the model does not actually show this; the dependent variable is log-transformed, and the model is a fixed-effects panel specification, so the coefficient represents a conditional association within the model rather than a straightforward percentage prediction. While it can be interpreted mathematically, it should not be interpreted as a causal effect.
  
  Annual precipitation is not statistically distinguishable from zero (β = −0.0496, p = 0.7032). This does not demonstrate that precipitation has no effect on wildfire behaviour; rather annual aggregation may obscure relationships that may occur on shorter timescales.
  
  The strongest statistically significant relationship in this model is the lagged burned-area variable (β = 0.21, p = 0.0013). Provinces with greater burned area in the previous year tend to have greater burned area in the current year, conditional on the other variables and fixed effects. There are several potential explanations for this; regional climatic conditions, landscape characteristics, changes to fuel structure, etc; but the annual model cannot distinguish between them.

• Human-caused area burned: The human area model has an R-squared of 0.7629. Neither mean temperature (p = 0.4207) nor precipitation (p = 0.2563) reaches conventional statistical significance thresholds. None of the forestry treatment variables are statistically significant, either.
  
  The lagged human-burn variable has a positive coefficient (β = 0.1072, p = 0.0922), providing weak evidence at the 10% level of temporal persistence, but not at the conventional 5% threshold.
  
  The important result is therefore partly what the model does not find: at annual provincial resolution, human-caused burned area is not clearly explained by the broad climatic variables included in the model.

• Natural fire counts: here, the R-squared is 0.9077, making it one of the highest-fitting models in the exercise. Mean temperature has a positive relationship with with natural fire counts (β = 0.2167, p = 0.0024), while precipitation has a negative one (β = −0.1997, p = 0.0313). Both are statistically significant.
  
  Current year insect defoliation is also positively associated with natural fire counts (β = 0.1322, p = 0.0182), while lagged defoliation has a negative relationship (β = −0.1197, p = 0.0084). This is an interesting pattern, but the model does not establish the mechanism behind it. We can interpret it as insect damage and its effects on fuels change over time, but the coefficients alone cannot tell us whether that is actually what is taking place.
  
  Two herbicide columns are also statistically significant. Helicopter-applied herbicide has a positive relationship with natural fire counts (β = 0.1106, p = 0.0432), and ground-applied herbicide has a negative one (−0.0953, p = 0.0312).
  
  These coefficients are particularly useful as an illustration of why statistical significance needs to be interpreted cautiously. The model has identified relationships, but it does not tell us that herbicide application itself causes either more or fewer fires. The variables may be associated with particular types of forestry activity, geography, access, land management, or other characteristics that are not fully represented in the data.

• Human-caused fire counts: the R-squared here is 0.9233, the highest fit of the four models. The dominant relationship is temporal persistence: the previous year’s human-fire counts has a standardized coefficient of β = 0.4963 (p < 0.001). Provinces with more human-caused fires in one year, tend to have more in the following years. As above, human-caused fires occur where there are humans. The relationship may be proxying for human presence.
  
  Precipitation is negatively associated with human fire counts (β = −0.2218, p = 0.0172). Mean temperature, wind speed, insect defoliation, forestry production, and the herbicide variables are not statistically significant in this specification.
  
  The absence of a significant temperature relationship is noteworthy, in particular when compared with the natural fire model. It is consistent with the basic observation that human ignitions require human activity: their geographic and temporal distribution is constrained by where people, infrastructure, recreation, and industrial activity occur. Weather may affect whether those ignitions grow or persist, but the annual count of human-caused ignitions is not simply a function of broad provincial temperature trends.

Caveats and limitations: the next steps

We will perhaps have more, better insight be adapting the model for more granular data, using monthly, instead of annual averages. With monthly aggregates we can gleam more nuance that specifically targets the wildfire season, and annual averages hide temperature and precipitation impacts. For example, a 2C average temperature increase in spring may suggest a potentially earlier thaw and extended fire season, the same average increase in July is significant as well, but these are diluted over annual aggregates. Similarly, increased snowfall during winter may dilute reduced precipitation in relevant months.

Unfortunately not all of our dataset is available as monthly breakdowns. I was able to find fire number and area data by province, as well as monthly climate data. There are two options to proceed using hybrid data:

1. Average out annual data we already have, to a monthly basis. This is to be avoided because it’s not real data. OR

2. Adapt the extant model to accommodate one-to-many relationships between monthly and annual data.

Option two is preferred as it does not invent data that isn’t in our dataset.

As well, a curious relationship emerged between ground-applied herbicides and natural fire counts, in this case, aside from Quebec, natural fires are far more common than human-caused, and ground-applied herbicides are typically applied in managed areas where there is road access. Because out dataset is not spatially-aware, it will not capture these distinctions.

Standardized coefficients in the monthly models are calculated using the conventional pooled-sample standardization, β* = β(σX/σY). Unlike the annual models, the monthly regressions do not z-score variables separately within each province.

Shifts at monthly granularity

Moving from annual to monthly observations, even partially, produces an immediate and superficially undesirable result: R-squared falls substantially. The four monthly models range from 0.35 to 0.61, compared with 0.76 to 0.92 in the annual models.

This is not necessarily a deterioration in the model. A higher R-squared is not inherently evidence of a better model, particularly when comparing different levels of aggregation. The annual models capture broad provincial and year-level patterns that are less prominent at monthly resolution. The monthly models instead allow us to examine whether relationships that appear important in the annual data visible when the data is disaggregated.

There are significant changes from the annual models:

1. Weather becomes much more prominent. In the natural area model, mean temperature has a standardized coefficient of β = 0.4883 (p < 0.001), while precipitation has a negative coefficient of β = −0.1307 (p < 0.001). Both are statistically significant at monthly resolution, whereas precipitation was not significant in the annual model. This is consistent with the possibility that annual aggregation obscures short-term weather relationships; a particularly warm or dry period during fire season can have a substantial relationship with fire activity even when those conditions are diluted by the rest of the year.
   
   Temperature is also strongly associated with natural fire counts β = 0.5214, p < 0.001), while precipitation is negatively associated with them (β = −0.1581, p < 0.001). The monthly specification therefore produces a much clearer relationship between contemporaneous weather conditions and wildfire activity than the annual specification.

2. The intertemporal relationship changes substantially. In the annual models, last year’s burned area strongly predicts this year’s burned area (β = 0.21, p = 0.0013). In the monthly model, the corresponding lag loses statistical significance (β = 0.0348, p = 0.2860). This suggests that the persistence observed at annual resolution may reflect broader landscape or climatic conditions rather than a simple short-term carryover effect. A large fire during one period, for example, may alter fuel availability in the area immediately afterward, while broader regional conditions continue to influence fire activity over longer periods. The model cannot distinguish between these mechanisms, but the change between temporal resolutions is itself informative.

3. Human-caused burned area becomes much more weather sensitive. Unlike the annual model, the monthly human-area model finds statistically significant relationships for temperature (β = 0.2894, p < 0.001), precipitation (β = −0.2480, p < 0.001), and wind speed (β = 0.1805, p = 0.0094).
   
   This does not establish that any of these variables “govern” human-caused fires. Rather, it suggests that weather conditions have a much clearer association with the amount of area burned by human-caused fires when examined at fire season timescales. One plausible interpretation is that weather affects whether human caused ignitions develop into larger fires, even if the underlying occurrence of those ignitions is primarily determined by human activity and geography.

4. Forestry variables produce additional relationships at monthly granularity. In the natural area model, biological treatment (log_bt) is statistically significant (β = 0.1026, p = 0.007), as is helicopter-applied herbicide (β = 0.1780, p < 0.001). In the human-area model, fixed-wing herbicide is negatively associated with burned area (β = −0.1543, p = 0.0038), while helicopter herbicide is positively associated with it (β = 0.1295, p = 0.0085)..
   
   These results are useful primarily as examples of the interpretive problem explored throughout this article. They identify statistical relationships, but the model cannot establish that the treatments themselves cause these changes. The variables may instead be associated with particular forestry practices, locations, access conditions, fuel characteristics, or other factors not represented in the dataset. The changing coefficients between specifications are therefore more interesting than any simplistic claim that a particular treatment increases or decreases wildfire activity.

5. Human fire counts show a similar weather relationship while retaining strong temporal persistence. Temperature (β = 0.2664, p < 0.001), precipitation (β = −0.1910, p < 0.001), and wind speed (β = 0.1252, p = 0.0234) are all statistically significant. The lagged human-fire count is also strongly associated with current counts (β = 0.3693, p < 0.001). This is consistent with persistent differences in human activity, infrastructure, recreation, and industrial presence between jurisdictions, although the model cannot distinguish among those explanations.

In brief:

Annual granularity

• Higher R-squared

• Broad provincial and year-level patterns

• Weather relationships can be diluted by aggregation

• Stronger annual persistence

Monthly granularity

• Lower R-squared

• Stronger contemporaneous weather relationships.

• Some relationships appear or disappear with temporal resolution

• Forestry variables produce additional relationships requiring careful interpretation.

The important result is not that the monthly models are “better” because they have lower or higher R-squared. They answer a somewhat different question. Disaggregation exposes relationships that annual averages may obscure, while also demonstrating that relationships appearing strong at one level of granularity may weaken at another.

That is arguably the more important finding: the level at which we choose to measure a phenomenon can materially change the relationships the model appears to find.

When a one-month lag isn’t a one-month lag

There is another, considerably more mundane problem hidden in the monthly specification.

The monthly dataset was restricted to the active fire season, May through September before autoregressive lagged variables were calculated. The model then used a one-period shift(1) within each province to construct the lagged dependent variables.

At first glance, this appears to create a one-month lag as one would expect, but there’s a catch: It doesn’t.

June’s lag is May, July’s is June, and so on, so forth, but for May, the lagged value is the previous September. The final relationship is not a one-month lag at all, rather it’s the end of the previous active fire season.

This is not a particularly exotic statistical problem. It is a mundane data-processing mistake. The code did exactly what it was instructed to do: shift(1) returned the previous observation. The previous observation is not what we’d expect, and it skews the results and fundamentally changes the question being posed.

This may nevertheless yield interesting results, September-to-May persistence could reflect overwintering fuel conditions, landscape state, or other process spanning the offseason. But again that’s an entirely different hypothesis from short-term monthly persistence.

The important point is that nothing in the regression output would necessarily tell us that this had happened. The variable has a perfectly plausible name, produces perfectly plausible numbers, and can produce a statistically significant coefficient. Without inspecting how it was constructed, it would be very easy to interpret it as a one-month lag simply because it was labelled lag1.

This is precisely why iterative statistical analysis requires interrogation of the data-generating process, rather than treating the regression table as the end of the analysis. The model can be mathematically correct, but nevertheless answer a subtly different question from what its author intended.

The implication is not that the monthly model is invalid, overwinter conditions can be useful. The implication is that the result needs to be interpreted according to the variable that was ultimately constructed, rather than what the author intended. Correcting the lag would be an obvious next iteration, but comparing the two specifications can be informative: one measures short term persistence, the other incidentally measures persistence across the fire-season boundary.

The regression cannot tell us that we constructed the variable incorrectly. We have to ask the regression what variable we actually gave it. Mistakes are part of the iterative process, they sometimes produce useful results, if we’re aware of them.

The Glyphosate question and spatial proxy confounding

To Evaluate ongoing policy claims regarding silvicultural herbicide bans and wildfire suppression, 010_flyphosate_quebec_null_hypothesis.py isolated glyphosate application (log_glyphosate) as a separate variable, across a 2001-2024 panel, using Quebec as an empirical benchmark following its 2001 ban of public forest land.

The raw data includes herbicide use by type and method of application, the dataset aggregates them into each other for totals. The obvious step is to separate out glyphosate usage into its own variable, but as we’ll see, there are numerous issues and pitfalls.

econometric pitfalls: spatial omitted variable bias

Running the baseline panel yields a statistically significant negative coefficient for glyphosate (Beta = -0.1452, p - 0.0194), suggesting that higher glyphosate use correlates with lower burn acreage. Reiterating, on the surface, it looks like the model is telling us that glyphosate actually suppresses fire spread. However, this is a textbook example of proxy confounding,

The glyphosate variable is inadvertently acting as a proxy for several other factors; namely forestry management and other preventative measure, absorbing their explanatory power.

1. The managed tenure trap: Silvicultural glyphosate is applied exclusively within managed forestry zones. As such, log_glyphosate acts as a spatial proxy for intense forestry infrastructure, road networks, clear site access, proximity to initial-attack ground crews, often well withing scooper or water-bomber range, and active suppression monitoring.

2. Macro vs. Micro distortion: Provincial-level models compare managed forestry zones against millions of hectares of unmanaged northern wilderness (with no, or limited access and no herbicide treatment). The model misattributes suppression access to chemical application.

3. Quebec empirical evidence: Arguments that Quebec’s low average fire incidence is mono-causally linked to its 2001 glyphosate ban fail under historical analysis. Post-ban years such as 2002, 2013, and 2023 saw massive burned area, while several pre-ban years recorded exceptionally low fire counts. Single-variable causality cannot hold across historical volatility. Similarly, pre-ban years such as 1991, 1995, and 1996 had fewer fires than 2023, but nowhere near as much area burned.

Even if we were to account for zoning (wilderness vs managed zones) we’d still likely see log_glyphosate acting as a false positive when using Quebec as a null hypothesis simply because in Quebec, human-caused fires, which typically occur in managed areas are far more common than natural ignitions, while the trend is the inverse in other regions.

The core issue is that simply separating out glyphosate application into a separate variable, isn’t sufficient to actually isolate its effects. A far more complex model and dataset would be required, perhaps one employing spatial grid data, identifying each grid tile as manage or not, in addition to ascertaining how to isolate glyphosate and its impacts from all other factors, all at a grid-level. This adds a whole lot of complexity for little explanatory power, but is perhaps worthwhile in a model dedicated to determining glyphosate’s impact on forestry.

Brief structural and operational view of provincial assets

This section is a brief glimpse at figures which seem intuitive and may seem more explanatory than they actually are. Forest area, water bomber fleets, number of fires and extent for 2025, and coverage per bomber in square kilometres. This section serves to demonstrate that the recurring traps and interpretative hurdles mentioned throughout this article aren’t exclusive to statistical modelling and analysis, they apply to simple data tables as well.

At first glance, one would assume that Quebec, which has the worst area coverage of any jurisdiction would perhaps have worse results than Manitoba or NWT which have much better coverage density. However, both have substantially more area burned on significantly fewer fires than Quebec does.

Simply looking at something like coverage obscures that in Quebec human-caused ignitions (in managed areas) are far more frequent than natural ignitions, which facilitates rapid response, with the province’s scooper fleet taking advantage of lake density in the affected areas for fire suppression at the micro level before they spread. The higher spatial load becomes a vulnerability in times of black swan weather events (such as 2023) where multiple simultaneous remote fires quickly overwhelm suppression capacity.

The Northwest Territories, however, has among the highest area burned despite being at the low end of ignition frequency. Because NWT is sparsely populated and comprised mainly of uninhabited wilderness, suppression efforts are likely prioritised in remote inhabited communities and infrastructure, while wilderness fires are left to burn. The spatial burden is similar to other eastern provinces, but the operational logic is wildly different.

Otherwise intuitive seeming metrics like km2/bomber don’t tell us this story. It’s not very useful on its own.

Conclusions

The purpose of this exercise was not to construct a definitive model of Canadian wildfire behaviour. It was to examine what can be learned from relatively simple models, how those models can potentially mislead, and how the process of interrogating their results can inform the next stage of research and analysis.

Several of the results illustrate why statistical modelling is an iterative process rather than a search for the single correct specification.

The first lesson is that model fit is not the same as model usefulness. The annual models produced substantially higher R-squared values than their monthly counterparts. That does not make them inherently better models. Annual aggregates can absorb broad structural differences and produce impressive explanatory power while simultaneously obscuring relationships that occur in more nuanced, more granular datasets. The monthly models explained less variance, but in several cases produced relationships that were more interpretable once the analysis was restricted to the fire season. A lower R-squared can thus represent a more useful model if it better corresponds to the relationship being investigated.

The second lesson is that statistical significance does not explain a variable. The glyphosate exercise provides a useful example. the model produced a statistically significant relationship, the kind that could drive click-bait headlines, but that result did not establish the mechanism suggested by the variable’s name. Instead, it raised the possibility that glyphosate usage was correlated with a collection of unmeasured characteristics of managed forestry areas. The important finding was therefore not that the coefficient was positive or negative, but that the available data could not cleanly distinguish the competing explanations.

This is also why apparently intuitive variables require scrutiny. A measure such as waterbomber area coverage can appear to be an obvious indicator of suppression capacity, yet the statistic itself does not contain information about operational doctrine, geography, water access, deployment priorities, response times, or the distribution of fires. The variable may still contain useful information, but its interpretation depends on what it actually measures.

The appropriate response to these problems is not necessarily to discard the model. It is to ask what the result tells us about the next iteration.

If a variable appears to be acting as a proxy, what additional variables would allow the underlying mechanisms to be separated? If annual aggregation produces an ambiguous relationship, would monthly or weekly resolve it? If provincial averages conceal important spatial variation, would grid-level data be necessary? If a suppression metric appears counterintuitive, what operational information would be required before it could be interpreted meaningfully?

This exercise provides a practical argument for starting small.

It is possible to construct increasingly complex and elaborate models involving hundred of thousands of observations, extensive environmental covariates, detailed operational records, and large collections of administrative data. Such models may be necessary when the objective is to isolate a specific causal mechanism. They are not necessarily required for discovering which questions require that level of complexity in the first place. A simpler model can serve as a diagnostic instrument to identify relationships worth investigating, demonstrate where aggregation hides information, expose variables that may be unintended proxies, and offer insight into what hidden variables are likely to matter.

Simpler models also raise questions in terms of what to investigate and what could be interesting to look into and how. For instance, in this exercise, the question arises as to why in Quebec, human-caused fires are far more common than naturally ignited ones, and what the operational implications are. It also reveals what modelling glyphosate effects may require. They can serve as an indicator not only of how the model can be refined, but of what avenues of research to pursue.

Moreover it exposes an analytical trap. While these simple models paint a picture that is in line with mainstream research; that climate factors are the main driver for increased wildfire frequency, extent, and severity, it doesn’t establish that link nor statistically demonstrate it. Alignment with consensus is not a substitute for methodological rigour. Much more granular and extensive grid data, along with substantially more intricate and complex modelling is required to make that determination. Failure to make this distinction drives the common view that statistics can be cajoled and manipulated into painting any picture; a simple narrative focusing only on variance coverage and statistical significance can for example, result in pushing that glyphosate usage actively contributing to reduced fire incidence and extent, but we don’t actually know that, not from these models, at least.

Statistical analysis is therefore not simply a process of selecting variables, running regressions, and accepting coefficients that meet a significance threshold. It is an iterative process of specification, observation, criticism, and refinement. The model is tested against the data, the results are tested against the conceptual framework, and discrepancies between the two become information for the next iteration.

Canadian wildfire data happens to provide an unusually good case study for this process because the underlying system is sufficiently complex to generate all of these problems at once: temporal aggregation, spatial heterogeneity, proxy variables, omitted variables, endogenous responses, operational confounding, and substantial differences between what a variable measures and what we would ideally like it to measure.

The objective, ultimately, is not to find the model that produces the most impressive statistics. It is to understand what those statistics actually tell us.

“Technological advance is an inherently iterative process.
One does not simply take sand from the beach and produce a Dataprobe.
We use crude tools to fashion better tools, and then our better
tools to fashion more precise tools, and so on. Each minor refinement
is a step in the process, and all of the steps must be taken.”

— Chairman Sheng-ji Yang, “Looking God in the Eye”

Replicating the exercise

Project files are available on GitHub

003_timeseries_regressions_no_mobilised.py runs the annual regression.
008_direct_monthly_adaptation.py runs the monthly hybrid regression.
010_glyphosate_quebec_null_hypothesis.py runs the glyphosate regression.

This codebase represents an iterative exploratory process. While the primary regression scripts documented in the article are fully functional and reproducible, several helper scripts, legacy data-transformation passes, and feature-engineering experiments remain in the repo. Some of these served as temporary stepping stones wand I don’t remember what they do.

Data acquisition

Number of fires by cause: http://nfdp.ccfm.org/en/data/fires.php#:~:text=3.2.3%20Area%20burned%20by%20fire%20size%20class.,1990.%201991.%201992.%201993.%201994.%201995.%201996.

Area burned by cause: http://nfdp.ccfm.org/en/data/fires.php#:~:text=3.2.3%20Area%20burned%20by%20fire%20size%20class.,1990.%201991.%201992.%201993.%201994.%201995.%201996.

Number of fires by size: http://nfdp.ccfm.org/en/data/fires.php#:~:text=3.2.3%20Area%20burned%20by%20fire%20size%20class.,1990.%201991.%201992.%201993.%201994.%201995.%201996.

Area burned by size: http://nfdp.ccfm.org/en/data/fires.php#:~:text=3.2.3%20Area%20burned%20by%20fire%20size%20class.,1990.%201991.%201992.%201993.%201994.%201995.%201996.

mobilization stats: https://ciffc.ca/mobilization-stats/

Climate data: data is collected in 10,000 entry increments from https://api.weather.gc.ca/collections/ahccd-annual/items?f=csv&datetime=1990-01-01/2024-12-31&limit=10000 and https://api.weather.gc.ca/collections/ahccd-monthly/items?f=csv&datetime=1990-01-01/2024-12-31&limit=10000&offset=300000 . Stitched into the first file, removing the first line of headers with “awk ‘FNR>1’ file2 file3 … fileN » consolidated.csv”.

bilingual AHCCD headers were mapped to English headers, monitoring station data was grouped and aggregated by province and year. arithmetic mean was computed across all reporting station in a province for each metric, skipping NaN entries to avoid skewing. Derived station_count by calculating the number of unique active stations identifiers (station_id) reporting in which province for a given year. Final results were filtered to retain only data between 1990 and 2024.

Because data is only available until 2024, a python script was used to loop through the station IDs and hit the climate-daily endpoint on the weather.qc.ca API to fill gaps.

Preface:

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has long been treated as the cornerstone case for arguments about authoritarian regime stability under modernization. It anchors both claims of inherent instability and discussions of authoritarian resilience, and for that reason serves as an especially appropriate test of the dominant narrative.

This paper begins with a conventional structure; a review of the relevant literature followed by a detailed case study, but the material itself leads in a different direction. The authoritarian instability and resilience literatures do not function as competing hypotheses. Instead, they largely share the same foundational assumptions: that liberal democracy represents the only sustainable long-term pathway to modernization, and that authoritarian durability, where it occurs, reflects a temporary deviation or postponement rather than robust alternative equilibria. The resulting literature review is therefore inherently disjointed, as it maps two strands that ultimately affirm the same underlying teleology.

Re-examining the mechanisms behind the Soviet collapse reveals a more contingent story. The regime achieved rapid modernization from a feudal base, sustained decades of relative prosperity and social order for much of its population, and managed its nationalities question under successive leaderships — until Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost reforms reopened and amplified latent structural vulnerabilities embedded in early Bolshevik nation-building policies. This sequence does not map neatly onto expectations of inevitable authoritarian incapacities.

The broader implication is that the absence of a more granular, type-agnostic framework for understanding regime stability and instability leaves significant perceptual vulnerabilities. Assumptions of liberal inevitability can create an undue sense of security, blinding analysts and policymakers to shared mechanisms of fragility (such as identity cleavages, reform sequencing risks, and the bypass of institutional constraint) that operate across regime types. In a world of proliferating hybrid systems, these blind spots increase the risk that the very destabilizing dynamics states might seek to exploit in rivals could rebound on their own societies.

Conventional wisdom:

While to my knowledge there isn’t really a concrete theory on authoritarian states being inherently unstable or doomed to fail, it is a prevailing narrative in present day international politics that warrants exploration.

Autocracies are “fundamentally constrained by deep-seated incapacities” and are not viable, cannot be successful (Deudney. p.78). Autocracies will inevitably move toward liberalism, and any limited success they see are a function of their access to the liberal international order due to “powerful logic that connects modernization and liberalization” (Deudney, p.79). Liberal democracy represents the sole pathway to sustained modernization, the only successful model (Deudney,pp 79-80). Rising living standards will inevitably create a middle class whose interests will eventually conflict with those of the ruling class, and independent rights in the economic sphere pose an intrinsic limitation upon state power, and the specialization and complexity that comes with an industrialized economy creates a divergence of interests which demands for competitive elections (Deudney, pp.83-84).

Where the fundamental incapacities of authoritarian systems are concerned is defined in three parts. First, rampant corruption which due to the parasitic relation between the state and private firms will lead to calls for increased accountability. The second is deep contradictions related to inequality. Autocracies are unable to meet the needs of the working class like democratic parties are (Deudney, pp.84-85). The third is the performance-limiting effect of insufficient flows of information; closed political systems are prone to policy mistakes due to censorship and the lack of open policy debate (Deudney, pp.85-86). Statistically, democracies are longer lasting than autocracies (Gates, p.900).

Dictatorships are capable of maintaining political order after a fashion due to the monopoly on violence and ability to restrain and suppress dissent. They are able to withstand domestic pressure through co-opting, corporatism or outright purges. there is no pluralism to threaten the monopoly on political power (Tusalem, p.10) Rentier states are able to resist forces of democratization (Tusalem, p.11). Inability to control dissent renders authoritarian states more likely to collapse as do threats to legitimacy (Tusalem, p.11). Although Tusalem concedes that autocratic states are less likely to foster political stability, they also attest that no clear patterns can be gleamed from this analysis. There are many intervening variables, such as economic development, religious fracturing, institutional arrangements, ethnic discord, etc that affect the dependent variable (Tusalem, p.23), though many of these variables can be observed to be lessened in states with high levels of democracy (Tusalem, p24). Tusalem also suggests that the very tools that afford autocracies their resilience -- repression --can increase instability (Tusalem, p.32)

It is also argued that a richer society and growing middle class will ultimately lead to democratic reform (this collapsing an authoritarian regime) but this presupposes that freedom is an innate right yearned for by all individuals (Lee, p. 103). Lee suggests that as the middle class grows it will extend more control over economic power and become less dependent on the state in pursuit of the “good life” in other countries which inately constrains the state due to its independence on the emerging middle class to generate economic growth (Lee, p.104). While modernization theory has not been disproved, authoritarian resilience remains poorly understood (Lee, p.106).

Ideological democrats will tend to blame the party in power, non-ideological democrats will tend to blame the system as a whole when democracies fail to meet public expectations (Lee, p.107). The presence of a strong autocratic power, present day China, in Lee’s estimation (and presumably the USSR in the era prior to stagnation) have the passive effect of making autocracy in general more resilient (Lee, p.108). The line of thought that prioritizes practical outcomes over individual rights without regard for consequences also adds to this resilience, as well as laxing of regulations to invite foreign investment (Lee, p.109-111)

Literature review:

Case Study:

Why did the Soviet Union collapse?

Arms Race, Strategic Defence initiative, and spending gap:

While the strategic defence initiative figures heavily into the discussion of the arms race and the USSR spending itself into oblivion, a detailed examination of its specifics are outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that the USSR had been independently developing similar technologies (Perle, p. 27) and that the technologies required to make Reagans speech on the subject even vaguely realistic (Panofsky, p.36). We will instead focus on defence spending and the supposed “spending gap”.

There is little, if any empirical evidence to lend credence to suggestions that American and Soviet spending and defence policy were reactive to one another in a macro sense (Ostrom, p.819). American military spending nearly tripled from, $77 billion in 1968 to $238 billion on the mid 1980s. Estimates of Soviet spending between 1972 and 1980, and up to 1986 were significantly lower than US expenditures (Ostrom, p. 820). Figures based on Soviet reporting were unsatisfactory and led to the development of the CIA’s own metrics for determining military expenditures – translating the cost in US dollars for the US to replicate observed Warsaw Pact activity, which led to a substantial upwards re-estimation of Soviet spending in 1979, based on the assumption that the USSR was willing to spend as much as 13% of its GDP on such expenditures, while overestimating the Soviet cost of production. As a result, these new estimates showed the US being outspent by 45% (Ostrom, p.820). Needless to say, these re-estimates were interpreted as a substantial increase in Soviet expenditures, though it can be shown that US spending was reactive to CIA estimates, the conclusion drawn, and Soviet spending estimates can be called into question via the CIA reports that it had overestimates the increases it reported through the whole of the 1977-83 period (Ostrom, p.838). By this point, CIA estimates had Soviet military expenditures at 20% of GDP (Steinberg, p.675). There are suggestions that “strategic” organizational biases influenced these overestimations resulting in nearly a doubling of US expenditures (Ostrom, p.839).

Western European analysts contested these figured based on the incapacity of reconciling them with Soviet net material product accounts, which pegged Soviet defence spending at a maximum of 9 or 10% of GDP (Steinberg, p.675). Soviet economists were split on expenditures being in line with American figures (roughly 15% of GDP), based on the Soviet economy being less than half of America’s with the same amount of resources required to maintain parity (Us spending being 6%/GNP) and taking in mind lower Soviet worker productivity (Steinberg, pp. 676-7), and much lower estimates based on economic growth reports through little growth and economic stagnation through the ‘80s (Steinberg, p. 676). In 1989, Gorbachev revealed Soviet defence spending to be SUR 77.3 billion ($106.76 billion in 1989 USD) -- less than half of the CIA estimates just 5 years prior – with zero growth in the military budget for 87-88 and a spending reduction by SUR 10 billion in 90-91 (Steinberg, p.677). And additional SUR 11 billion on the Buran program and the Ministry of internal affairs (Steinberg, p. 678). It is also noted that Soviet conscripts received no wages, and production costs were vastly different than American costs, factor into vastly different spending totals. These figures were also corroborated by the Chairman of the General Staff, who emphasized a preference for technological sophistication in US naval vessels and helicopters resulting in more expensive systems, combined with lower component costs and profits due to the command economy on the Soviet side (Steinberg, p.677). A reduction of 40% was expected through 1991-94. Steinberg rejects Ryzhkov’s figures citing CIA estimates and inflation (Steinberg, p.685) but does not account for overestimations identified by Ostrom. In brief, Soviet estimates used different metrics (national economic balances and utilized national income) rather than GDP, making difficult to estimate costs using American methods (Steinberg, p. 691).

Reconstructed Soviet input-output tables show defence spending increased from 63.5 billion SUR to 120 billion SUR from 1975 to 1987 (Steinberg, p.689). Ultimately, Steinberg concludes that Soviet defence spending was at 19.5% of GDP, arguing that Gosplan was deceiving the Soviet leadership (Steinberg, p. 696).

Franklin D. Holzman argues that the CIA and DIA grossly overexaggerated Soviet military expenditure estimates in part to spur increased American military spending as well as ostensibly for the purpose of justifying the considerable sum of resources expended for the purpose of making these estimates, he pegs Soviet military expenditures at 9-11% of GDP (Holzman, p.27-8). The CIA adjusted its findings, Holzman alleges, to conform to DIA estimates, and the methodology based on “building blocks” consists of attempting to ascertain the physical quantities of everything that may (or may not!) be considered part of the defence effort, and the quantities priced out in first 1970 constant Rubles, then in 1982 constant Rubles, while pricing out components in USD (not knowing the costs in Rubles), then converting to constant Rubles. Furthermore, CIA estimates included expenditures for costs that the United States did not consider to be military expenditures (Holzman, p.28).

Events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

There are many theories as to what ultimately was the main impetus for the dissolution of the Soviet Union raging from simplistic and diametrically opposed ideologically driven arguments of either the Soviet system not being democratic or liberal enough, or not being socialist enough, or not being the right variant of socialism (D.N., pp.2443-2444). Others, like Rafael Reuveny cite the Afghanistan War as the ultimate catalyst by means of accelerating Glasnost’s effects and undermining the KPSU’s legitimacy regarding non-Russian Soviet ethnic groups, instilling the idea that the Red Army could be defeated (Reuveny, p. 695). The argument however is predicated on the Soviet leadership acknowledging that their system was unsustainable but not realizing it until the mid-to-late 1980s (Reuveny, p.696).

Alexander Dalin attributes the dissolution to Gorbachev’s failure to implement clear economic reforms and failure to address the nationalities question and respond adequately to innumerable warnings of betrayal by political allies (Dalin, p.925-6) which ultimately caused the erosion of his authority and loss of support. Ron Hill corroborates these arguments in naming Gorbachev’s ill-conceived domestic policies as the main driver of dissolution (Hill, p.38). Following up on the Soviet system’s successes in managing inflation and unemployment from the ‘30s through to the ‘70s, the elite grew complacent, many Soviets viewing this period as the most prosperous of their lives. Though industrial growth had slowed and the economy stagnated to the point where the USSR with its vast agricultural resources could no long feed itself (Hill, pp.36-8). Natural resources had been exhausted, the soil salinated, rivers polluted, made for a breeding ground for social and environmental catastrophes. While it is clear that something needed to be done to reverse these trends as early as the 1970s (Hill, p.38), Hill singles out Gorbachev’s policies enacted as a means to do so as what ultimately led to the Union’s dissolution. Both ultimately attempts to liberalize the Soviet system. First, Perestroika, which in attempting to dismantle the administrative command system and the command economy, placed the burden of setting prices on more than 24 million products on the State Prices Committee, rendering it impossible to respond to shifting supply and demand, compounding and compounded by other reforms and lacklustre support from outside the Communist Bloc. Inflation obliterated savings, further compounding worsening economic conditions (Hill, p.39).

Second, with Glasnost aimed to attack what he deemed the KPSU’s “infallibility complex” and allowing the state press to unmask and expose corruption among the apparatchik, thus alienating them, and making the premier many powerful enemies. Gorbachev used these policies to remove political opposition and appoint like-minded liberal reformers in their place creating a feedback loop (Hill, pp.39-40). Not unlike a reformist version of Stalin’s purges a half-century prior. These actions faces resistance, led by traditionalist Yegor Ligachev on the right, and Boris Yeltsin on the left. Party discipline quickly was consigned to the past (Hill, p.40). Ligachev’s position is perhaps best exemplified by a 1988 Sovetskaya Rossiya article penned by Nina Andreeva, in brief accusing the new policies as seeking to destroy the legacy of attempts to undo Stalin’s industrial society in selling out to the west, and abandoning the values and discipline of her generation (Hill, p.41). Andreeva, and in extension, Ligachev were the voices of millions who felt their lives and their life’s work was being destroyed, their suffering in the Great Patriotic War, spat on. The party was deeply divided, and Gorbachev deemed democratization the solution (Hill, p.41).

Gorbachev tried to lead from the centre and bring the left and right in line, he attempted to achieve this by creating a (too) strong presidency which say him simultaneously holding the positions of president, general secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of the defence council to name only a few, created detractors even from his supporters. The whole system depended on the faculties of one overburdened man, who additionally faced several challenged from below (democraticization extended beyond the party) to his retention off control (Hill, p.41).

Expanding on Dalin’s point regarding the Nationalities question, the Glasnot era’s open political debate, Hill stipulates, made dissent meaningless, the lack of repercussions to challenging Moscow, resulted in Union Republics, led by Lithuania, and followed by Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even, eventually the Russian SFSR to begin to openly call for secession from the Soviet Union. In some Union republics, the Communist Party even had to break from Gorbachev to remain in power, in others, it allowed free elections, which removed it from power. It was open season on Soviet laws and policy (Hill, p.41-2). All of this was arguably manageable until the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, who sought to claim as much sovereignty as he could, and urged his counterparts in the other republics to do the same. Moreover, Yeltsin’s performance during the failed coup conferred to him authority and credibility at Gorbachev’s expense. He banned the KPSU from operating in the Russian SFSR, implemented policies that openly challenged Moscow, and finally, along with representatives from the Belorussian and Ukrainian SSRs established the Commonwealth of Independent States, essentially declaring independence from the USSR (Hill, pp.42-3). Shortly thereafter, Gorbachev had no choice but to formally dissolve the Soviet Union despite the all-union referendum results.

How did we get here (The nationalities problem)?

The Soviet Union was internally structures as having 5 tiers starting with the supranational union itself, and in descending order, the Union Republics, Autonomous as national or subnational units, and the Autonomous Oblasts and National Autonomous Okrugs (subnational or sub-subnational) (Scherbak, p7). Nationalism, perhaps counterintuitively, was central to discourse among self-professed internationalist Bolsheviks during the creation of the USSR, as they had mobilized a support base along ethnic and national lines within the former Russian Empire, promising self-determination as a measure of autonomy as well as a form of protection against assimilation into the Russian majority, in acknowledgement of the Tsars’ policies of russification (Scherbak, p.7).

The Russian empire, a unitary state did not account for sub nationalism in its structure or administration. Regional policy was conducted top-down from Petrograd. The last couple of Tsars, however (Aleksandr II and Nicholas II) themselves moderate nationalists, attempted to repress certain nationalities. The overarching Tsarist nationality policy was one of hybrid pan-Slavism and Pan-Orthodoxy, with only Finland and Poland having a semblance of autonomy (Scherbak, p.9)

The Bolshevik position made sense in the aftermath of nearly two dozen territories declaring independence during the Russian Civil War. Any other position could have risked being interpreted as a continuation of Russian colonialism. Bolshevik policy at this time would be characterized by siding with local nationalism against Russian nationalism (Scherbak, pp. 9-10).To policymakers in the nascent USSR, nation building and colonialism went hand in hand, both deemed a necessary transitionary step in the evolutionary timeline – peoples must first nationalize in order to eventually decolonize (Hirsch, pp.202-3). Whereas Western colonial powers were defined in opposition to their colonies, the USSR defined itself as the sum and an extension of its constituent parts. It is in this context that so-called “backward people” were to be transitioned into nations within new boundaries to foster cultural and national consciousness within the framework of a unified Soviet state (Hirsch, p. 204).

The policy of double-assimilation extended not only to central Asia and other regions, but to the elites within the communist party who were assimilated into these new official nationalities as well, and those, in turn, into the Soviet state and wider Soviet society (Hirsch, p.204). Curiously, these new nationalities were neither intrinsic nor fully arbitrary, and eventually became something manifestly real, be it via official policy or regional initiative in learning to manipulate policy for their own purposes. Self-determinations was used as a cover for organizing state administrative infrastructure as drawing boundaries along economic or industrial grounds would be interpreted as imperialist and exploitative (Hirsch, p. 205). On one hand these policies were a demonstration of benevolent colonialism where the colonizer assists the colonized in attaining cultural, economic, and industrial development in a non-imperialist mode contrary to the capitalist mode of colonialism, and on the other, a glorified affirmative action program favouring non-Russians over ethnic Russians (Hirsch, pp.207-8).

The Belorussian SSR was created in pursuit of political ends, serving as a buffer between the USSR and independent Poland, as well as a counterweight to nationalistic tendencies in the Ukrainian SSR as well as a demonstration of goodwill to ethnic Polish Belorussians. This, despite protestations of Belarussians who, citing historical ethnographic data identified as culturally, ethnically, and linguistically Russian (Hirsch, pp.209-10). Conversely, Ukrainian claims on the Voronezh and Kursk regions, citing those same ethnographic records were rejected on the grounds of those regions’ industrial and economic infrastructure being integral to the Russian SFSR (Hirsch, pp.211). There were also outcomes distinct from the outright Belorussian rejection and eager embrace by pre-existing national consciousness, where the Soviet initiated policy was taken by the target minority and run with as a local movement. For instance, the creation of the Khakass Okrug out of a consolidation of various western Siberian clans and tribes which did not previously define themselves as either Khakass or even as a singular interrelated people. Nevertheless, a Khakass intelligentsia emerged, rallying the disparate tribes around this newly invented Khakass nationality. The Khakass people, by the end of the decade opposed a push to eliminate Okrugs inconsequential to union-scale economic development and consolidating their territories into autonomous oblasts, as encroaching on their national rights, the Khakass representatives arguing for the ethnographically distinct nature of the Khakass nation warranting recognition in an official treaty (Hirsch, pp.212-14).

Soviet Central Asia say some extreme cases as well, where prior to this Soviet-led nation-building initiatives and the concept of official nationalities could monopolize natural resources and land, and though there was no conception of nation, nor did the people of Turkestan, Bokhara, and Khiva define themselves in such terms. A diverse populace lived interspersed over vast areas, most at one point or another nomadic, people commonly claimed multiple identities at once. In point of fact, Vasiliy Bartol’d, a Soviet ethnographer, described the initiative as “an adaptation of a nineteenth-century West European historical tradition, alien to the region” (Hirsch, p. 213-14). While the intention was to equalize power relations between “advanced” and “backward” peoples, the net result was the creation of minority nationalities as an underclass of sorts within each new national republic. The official nationalities which understood the system, re-framed their concerns and interests in the official language f nationality as a means to consolidate territories, resources, and power, complete with the trappings of such dynamics. Majority nationalities used force and intimidation to inflate census numbers, while new national minorities faced discrimination, assimilation and the loss of land and livelihood as a consequence of linguistic, cultural and physical differences (Hirsch, p.214).

Settlements in the “wrong” national territories petitioned the state to further redraw borders on the basis of injustice. In Tashkent, now self-styled Kazakhs submitted appeals to be joined to the Kazakh SSR as the Uzbek SSR neglected and discriminated against the Kazakh region. Just a decade prior the same people commonly used compound identities such as Kazakh-Uzbek or Tajik-Uzbek. It was through Soviet nationality policy that Kazakh, Tajik, and Uzbek became distinct identities. *Hirsch, p.215). In the case of the Aimsk region’s petitioners’ narrative, the stakes became increasingly urgent over time, escalating from concerns of loss of land, to fear for their safety as Uzbeks with a Kyrgyz republic. It is unknown whether the people in question legitimately believed that they were part of a distinct Uzbek nationality (Hirsch, p.216) -- which once again, did not exist at the beginning of the decade. In the beginning of the post-Soviet period, scholars and politicians in Central Asia were denouncing Soviet nationality policy as a means to repress Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik and Kyrgyz national aspirations (Hirsch, p.202) which came into existence only as a direct consequence of Soviet nationality policy. It is ironic that throughout the Cold War, western observers denounced the SSSR as a “breaker of nations” (Hirsch, p.201)-- which there is prime example of below, in Burant -- only to acknowledge the opposite (Hirsch, p.202) when the political impetus changed.

Keith Darden correlates the intensity of OUN/UPA insurgent activity in Western Ukraine 1946-52 and pre-Soviet schooling in the regions of Stanislas where Austrian authorities endorses Ukrainization, and Transcarpathia, where Hungarian authorities opposed Ukrainization; with a similar level of education and density of social organization resulting in a growth of pro-Russian sentiment and as such a complete absence of anti-Soviet insurgency in Transcarpathia after World War II (Shcherbak, p.7). It is of little surprise then, that affirmative action policies favouring local nationalism vis-a-vis Russian nationalism reached its peak resulting in increased nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiment, precipitating the return to “great-power Russian nationalism” as official policy under Stalin (Scherbak, p. 11). This new Soviet nationalism emerged as a factor in explaining the Soviet people’s great courage and morale in defeating Germany in the Great Patriotic War (Eulau, p. 25), further Eulau argues that the constructive Soviet style of nationalism – as opposed to what he terms the destructive Tsarist nationalism that preceded it -- is a function of Stalin’s policy of Socialism in one country, and the removal of internationalist revolutionary socialism with the ousting of Trotsky, via isolationism until the rise of Hitler, collective security and popular front policies up until the onset of the Second Worth War, and finally the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Eulau, pp.25-27).

the policies of affirmative action favouring local minorities over the Russian majority came to a head resulting in unsurprisingly, increased nationalism and anti-Soviet, anti-communist sentiment, these policies ended under Stalin with the re-introduction of Russian centric nationalism, helped greatly by the rally around the flag effect during the Great Patriotic War (Shcherbak, p.11). Soviet nationality policy changed once more after Stalin’s death, being composed of three major elements: Anti-Stalinism, nativization, and gradual Russification. The first component was introduced immediately by Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, who condemned the great purges, attacking Stalin for abuses of power. Khrushchev returned to a position of praising the great contributions of the non-Russian nationalities to the war effort, and in 1957 allowed all the deported ethnicities to return to their national republics, the policy of peaceful coexistence was both foreign and domestic policy. Under Brezhnev, policy shifted to a more corporatist approach, with the party demanding absolute loyalty in exchange for social and political benefits. Brezhnev pushed a nativization approach to nationality policy of trusting the local elites. Power within the party in exchange for political loyalty (Shcherbak, p.14).

This policy too, led to increased local nationalism, as it quickly became apparent that there was little room for advancement beyond the confines of the ethnic republics at the all-Union level, the Union Republics increasingly took the semblance of sovereign state, complete with internal political institutions (Shcherbk, p.16).

Analysis

Deudney doesn’t really elaborate on what the “powerful logic” that binds modernization with liberal democracy is, as such his position seems more ideological than methodological. In our case study, which is chosen mainly because Deudney hinges his argument on it “Two decades ago, the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the international communist bloc seemed to resolve this debate in favour of the liberal side once and for all.” (Deudney, p.80). The Soviet Union in the late ‘80s did not really have an emerging middle class, and Gorbachev’s attempts to liberalize via Perestroika and Glasnost while not directly the cause for dissolution, were the catalyst for the ultimate cause of dissolution, it was able to modernize, however, especially relative to the feudal Tsarist system it replaced. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, it is perhaps forgotten that it was undergoing its industrialization period, similar to the industrial revolution in the west. The west didn’t skip that step, and it’s an unrealistic expectation for other regime types to do so.

He also doesn’t expand on what is meant by corruption or why it’s uniquely a problem in autocracies, or rather he does, but not convincingly, rule of law and restrictions on power he says limit corruption, but doesn’t address that corruption is a problem regardless of regime type. This is a common failing as corruption is often poorly defined. As mentioned in the case study, most defined the Soviet period as the most prosperous of their lives, clearly the autocratic state apparatus was able to meet the needs of the working classes, even during the period of stagnation. The closed information space and lack of policy debate is questionable as it was done in the soviet system just in a different way. Factionalism within the party takes the role of separate political parties.

It can also be argued the Soviet Union was not as stratified as either the empire before it, or the federation that succeeded it. The loss of legitimacy was a real factor in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev didn’t begin to lose legitimacy until after pushing through his reforms, and his loss of legitimacy to Boris Yeltsin was ultimately a direct consequence of allowing the nationalities problem to re-emerge. The other republics had no means to enforce their declarations of independence, but Russia’s declaration of independence was too much to recover from.

The curious part is that the Soviet Union did have institutions able to constrain the power of the head of state, but the head of state could easily bypass or eliminate those restraints on power, as Stalin did via the purges, and as Gorbachev did with his “soft purges”. This is perhaps the key differentiation, authoritarian leaders have the ability to bypass constraints on their executive power, which enables bad policymaking, but can also otherwise have the means to pass policy that handles problems that emerge. Seeing as the nationalities problem was solved under the successive leaderships of Stalin, Khrushchev, Andropov, and Brezhnev we can tentatively score one for the constructivists as leadership clearly did matter. Likewise, that it was solved under certain leaders, but erupted due to the bad policies of leaders with unchecked power, we can argue that the inability to deal with such problems isn’t inherent to authoritarian systems.

Ultimately none of the conventional wisdom’s catalysts for liberalization/regime failure played into Gorbachev’s decision to liberalize the system, and ultimately his hand was forced in terms of dissolution as it was Russia that declared independence.

Authoritarian resilience does not function as a good counter argument however, as it deals less with why autocracies persist and more with the resilience of the idea of authoritarianism as an alternative to liberal democracy. This isn’t particularly useful in determining why regimes fall.

We have a problem with scope and definitions, the “inevitability” of anything occurs on the timescale of eternity and isn’t useful. As well, Authoritarian systems, and more broadly regime types in general are too diverse to form a coherent model around, we need a taxonomy of regime types that is more granular than “Authoritarian or democratic” with common structural features in order to better answer why certain regime types fail more than others. For instance, “democratic or not” is not very useful when we can argue that America’s resilience comes from being a constitutional republic more than from its electoral system. For autocracies, once more, the proposed hypothesis doesn’t explain the emergence of sub nationalism in the USSR, or even really account for it as the primary cause for regime failure.

As for answering the question of whether the dissolution of the Soviet Union was inevitable, well in some sense it was, as sub nationalism was baked into the foundations of its creation via the Russian SFSR self-balkanizing into Union Republics created in some cases on entirely arbitrary premises. It however, didn’t need to be, as a series of leaders were able to mitigate and solve the problems posed by it, but these efforts were undone by subsequent reforms. While other economic and social problems would have been overcome by better policy, as suggested by the 1991 All-Union Referendum’s results overwhelmingly favouring retaining the Soviet Union indicating that the people largely supported such efforts to retain the system, the power of nationalism and elimination of systems meant to constrain it ultimately proved fatal, but one could argue not insurmountable, as other policies enables its re-emergence.

Ultimately the early Bolsheviks at the onset set themselves up with an arguably unnecessary uphill battle and problem for later generations to handle. The existence of a broadly inclusive multi-ethnic, multi-national pan-Soviet identity could have supplanted subnational movements as we see in the present day Russian Federation’s inherent multi-ethnic and multinational Russian identity, which is often lost in translation due to limits of language: Rossiyanin (the Russian nationality) as opposed to Ruskiy (the Russian ethnicity). As early Soviet nationality policy shows us, once the fires of nationalism are lit, they can quickly erupt into an inferno as in the Khakass case.

Policy Recommendations and conclusions

While this first point is not directly a policy recommendation we need a more granular taxonomical model for regime types than “Authoritarian or democratic” to better understand and observe regime longevity, resilience, and what causes regimes to falter. We cannot rely on ideologically motivated suppositions such as authoritarian regimes being inherently structurally unstable counting on our rivals to inevitably collapse themselves. Bad policy will harm any regime type, and such an approach catches us off guard when regimes are able to recover. Certain regime types may be less long-lasting than others, but why that is the case is more important than it being the case. This is especially crucial in the present age where hybrid regimes are increasingly commonplace.

where do authoritarian democracies for instance, in Hungary, Turkey, Slovakia or India fall? Do they inherit the caveats of autocracy, or do they benefit from democratic institutions and constraint on power? This must be studied further, and out extant models are inadequate.

the electoral system alone isn’t a safeguard a democracy against failure, strong institutions are. However, the lack of strong institutions and constraining structures of more autocratic systems can of course be exploited to destabilize adversaries by forcing them to overstep their institutions to deal with policy issues.

Moreover, a robust, inclusive civic national identity can ward against exploitation of societal divisions, sub nationalism, and ethnic nationalism. Here in Canada we now have a second separatist movement, and with land back gaining steam potentially a third on the horizon. The united states has arguably not been so divided and polarized in the modern area with white nationalism and Christian nationalism on the rise, and the Euroscepticism within the European union has in recent years gained a new lease on life. We are potentially just as vulnerable as our authoritarian counterparts.

Conversely, given the Soviet example, national ethos can be created on a whim and evolve into full on nationalist movements in short order, this is a potential weakness, in the absence of inclusive civic national identities that can be exploited to destabilize our adversaries, but we do need a better taxonomic model to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of our rivals in order to better do so, as it can backfire and create a rally around the flag effect where a strong unifying identity exists and the populace feels that it is being attacked from outside forces.

Addendum

This paper was written in mid-2024, quite a bit has changed, or at least accelerated since. In Canada, the Albertan separatist movement has become a vocal but fringe minority, but amplified in the online information spaces. The transatlantic partnership has never been so fragile, either. Recently Palantir’s “Technological Republic” manifesto hit the internet, and it plays into a lot of this. It clearly plays into in-group-vs-outgroup rhetoric, but doesn’t define the in-group, treating it as self-evident, and without naming any, brands some cultures produce vital advances, while others are dysfunctional and regressive. The fundamental trap is that culture is learned, not inherent, they can, as we see in the Khakas example be created on whim, and can, in the case of the Homo Sovieticus be nurtured into a unifying civic identity if the state transmits and nurtures it. We can see a contemporary example in the case of Quebec in the decades since the quiet revolution, the emergence of a distinct Quebecois identity and per recent censuses, ethnogenesis occurring in real time. In the inverse, Armenians were considered, in Palantir’s words, dysfunctional and regressive under Persian and Ottoman rule, but headed important advances during the Soviet period, upon being given the opportunity to do so. To reiterate, just as we seek to exploit societal divisions in foreign adversaries, we have similar vulnerabilities, identities can be constructed on a whim, and a unifying civil identity helps to lessen the vulnerability.

On the theory front, It is more widely acknowledged that hybrid regimes are increasingly the norm, but we still lack a comprehensive granular model for them. Liberalism remains largely tried to modernity, though China’s rise increasingly challenges this view. Nevertheless, post Cold War End of History triumphalism risks blinding us to our own vulnerabilities, as well as risking misperception spirals when it comes to our rivals. Those who have strong, unifying civic identities may rally behind the flag under perception of foreign meddling.

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Preamble
This paper was written in 2015; it is dated, and the salient point is not the predictions, which have come to take shape in some form or another, but the relationship between nuclear capabilities, doctrine, and posture, which was very much not the conventional wisdom at the time.

Much of the language reflects the information space of the time — China was not considered a great power, and the discourse centred around a regional balancer role. “Great power and/or hegemonic ambitions” as a possibility was overshadowed by “peaceful rise” discourse, which seems unthinkable today.

What’s also striking is the speed and scale at which the situation has changed. In 2015, China’s rural regions were remote, lacked connectivity ,and the PRC was not mechanised or even fully motorised. The relationship between China and Russia has reversed in recent years, with the former becoming the technology provider and benefactor. The size of the Chinese arsenal has nearly tripled to an estimated 600+ warheads over the last decade, with estimations that it’ll grow to 1,000+ by decade’s end. In 2025, the US National Security Strategy document qualified the PRC as a peer competitor.

This paper should stand on its own, and serves as a segue for a retrospective that I am writing. This has been edited for typos, grammar, and presentation, but is otherwise unchanged.

What leads a state to decide on employing a doctrine of assured retaliation (minimal deterrence) vis-à-vis sufficient deterrence, or overwhelming retaliation/mutually assured destruction? Are a state’s nuclear capabilities limited by its doctrine, as conventional wisdom perhaps holds? Or is a state’s nuclear doctrine decided upon as a result of its extant capabilities?

I propose the latter hypothesis, that a given state’s nuclear capabilities shape its doctrine, and that the nuclear capabilities of a state are, in turn, dependent on several factors, including political considerations: that is to say, political priorities, foreign policy ambitions, its positioning as a status quo or revisionist power, political or strategic culture, as well as what the likely political implications and reactions to a state’s nuclear program are anticipated to be. Equally important are physical limitations; a state’s ability to develop a nuclear arsenal may be hobbled by certain constraints imposed by geography and industrial capabilities (not everyone can build everything, nor does every state have the same priorities), and finally, military capabilities and level of technology. In brief, official doctrine can be interpreted as what a state says, but may not be what a state does or intends to do — it is merely a reflection of what a state is currently able to do.

The logically inverse hypothesis, which appears to be the conventional wisdom on the matter, is that a state’s capabilities are not entirely relevant to the formation of its nuclear strategy, and there are certainly examples of states that likely can field a large nuclear arsenal but choose not to. In brief, a state does not develop strategic nuclear capabilities beyond its doctrine, and this can certainly be true; however, I argue that it makes certain assumptions that don’t universally hold.

A State’s declarative doctrine is largely meaningless and cannot be taken as is on its own. The underlying logic of this claim plays heavily on the theory of credible deterrence. A state that espouses a doctrine of overwhelming retaliation or mutually assured destruction, but does not possess the delivery systems and warheads, nor the capability to build them, lags in the required technology, and does not have the surrounding military and industrial infrastructure to sustain and support a large arsenal has no credibility. It may claim to employ a doctrine of overwhelming retaliation, but it cannot deliver on that threat. Similarly, it is difficult to believe a state espousing a doctrine of minimal deterrence when it possesses a full nuclear triad, a large arsenal, advanced delivery systems, and an aggressive foreign policy that suggests an actual position that differs from the one declared.

It is important to analyse the political inclination of a state. Is it a status quo power? Who are its allies? Can it rely on a greater power’s nuclear umbrella? Is it aspiring to rise to great power status itself? What are its rivals doing in terms of nuclear programs? A state that can reliably count on its allies’ nuclear umbrella as a deterrent does not tend to require a large arsenal, nor even its own deterrent. A revisionist power vying for great power or (regional) hegemonic status, however, cannot politically rely on a nuclear umbrella; it would suggest acknowledgement that the possessor of the umbrella is a greater power and a certain, even if minimal, degree of subservience. The deployment of defence systems that weaken a state’s deterrent credibility also requires a response, likely in the form of an increased arsenal and modernised capabilities. The retention of a minimal doctrine in the face of mounting defences suggests an inability, rather than a doctrinal unwillingness to develop an appropriate response — this logic, of course, relies on neorealist assumptions of relative power and of survival being the ultimate objective of a state, as a rational actor, within a Darwinian international system. Equally important, how are a state’s neighbours and rivals likely to react to an obvious, large-scale nuclear build-up? While a state vying for great power status must be able to deter other great powers, it may also wish to avoid a classical security dilemma and the accompanying (overt) arms race.

Geography matters. It limits development. If a state possesses indigenous access to fissile materials, can it otherwise procure them from elsewhere? Does it have places to hide, or increase the survivability of its land-based delivery systems, or the infrastructure (which is, in turn, limited by and built around geographical features)? A mountainous state with poorly developed road and rail connectivity may be unable to leverage its remote regions for this purpose. Can it spread out its forces to increase survivability and second-strike capability? Does a state have open access to oceans or deep, remote littoral waters in which to hide its undersea deterrent?

Economy and industry also matter. Does a state have the technology necessary to develop a credible deterrent beyond what it already possesses? Can a state afford this development, and does it have the capability to build the requisite delivery systems indigenously? How healthy is its military-industrial complex, if it even has one? Can a state realistically sustain a larger arsenal, especially in the case of developing nations, and where does the expansion of its nuclear program fit on its list of development priorities?

Finally, what is the state’s perception of nuclear weapons? Do they have a use? Are they used purely to not be used (deterrence), or do they carry additional uses? Additionally, there is the matter of historical precedence; which extant nuclear power is the state in question most similar to, and as such, is most likely to seek to emulate?

These factors will be analysed in the context of the People’s Republic of China, whose historical use of minimal deterrence has puzzled many. It will also be briefly compared to other nuclear powers to ascertain which it is most similar to and which path it is most likely to follow. The major caveat in this exercise is that not much is known about China’s nuclear program (by design), and much of what is, is based on speculation.

What is the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear doctrine?

China’s nuclear program has its origins in the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1954-55, 1958) when Mao realised that China could not rely on the Soviet nuclear umbrella, as Moscow was not willing to escalate to a nuclear exchange with the United States for the sake of Chinese interests. It was reasoned, therefore, that the PRC must develop its own nuclear program.

During the Mao period, and after the Sino-Soviet Split, the main operational doctrine of People’s War was given a nuclear aspect, centred around the use of atomic demolition munitions planted throughout the routes of advance, which were most likely to be taken by Soviet armour divisions (Bannerjee, 2010, p.351). China claims to pursue a defensive policy aimed at deterring the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against China. Beijing’s declared position is also one of no first use under any circumstances, never threatening the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and a firm commitment to the prohibition of nuclear arms (Banerjee, 2010, pp.351-52).

This is perhaps best exemplified by the oft-cited address to the Central Military Commission in July of 2000 by Jiang Zemin, which outlines the “five musts” of Chinese nuclear weapons (Banerjee, 2010, p.352):

”China must own strategic nuclear weapons of a definite quality and quantity in order to ensure national security:”

“China must guarantee the safety of strategic nuclear bases and prevent against the loss of combat effectiveness from attacks and destruction by hostile countries;”

“China must ensure that its strategic nuclear weapons are at a high degree of war preparedness;”

“When an aggressor launches a nuclear attack against China, China must be able to launch nuclear counterattack and nuclear re-attack against the aggressor.”

“China must pay attention to the global situation of strategic balance and stability and, when there are changes in the situation, adjust its strategic nuclear weapon development strategy in a timely manner.”

Such an address gives the impression of a defensive policy, but allows leeway for Beijing to act differently in the midst of a real nuclear crisis (Banerjee, 2010, p.353). However, there is nothing specific to a minimal deterrence doctrine contained within those five musts; they are transposable to doctrines of sufficient or limited deterrence as well as doctrines of overwhelming retaliation and mutually assured destruction. It’s unmistakably realist in nature, flexible, and can be read as the Chinese nuclear program being conditional on the retention of the status quo, while it isn’t said explicitly, it can be interpreted as being implied that Beijing reserves the right to expand its arsenal and deterrent capability as it sees fit, contingent on the posture of its rivals.

This is an interpretation corroborated by other analyses, particularly in relation to the American Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) deployments, and the general tone of Sino-American relations, which have been described as mutually ambivalent (Yoshihara, 2008, p.38) as key triggers to Chinese nuclear expansion. Moreover, while the five musts do not explicitly call for first use, they do not expressly disallow it, either.

To wit, in July of 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu declared to foreign press that “if the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition onto the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons”. It is unclear if this refers to a change in doctrine and capabilities or to actual nuclear strikes. Chenghu also argues that were the PRC to be faced with defeat in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, it would be forced to launch nuclear attacks on American cities (Yoshihara, 2008, p.37). This begs the question: Is the conventional interpretation of China’s doctrine as minimalist and defensive accurate? These statements indicate Beijing’s willingness to resort to nuclear first-use to protect its national interests, under certain conditions, and, once again, imply that its current nuclear configuration is conditional. Shen Dingly has also stated that if Taiwan were to take the opportunity to declare de jure independence, China would indeed have to exercise its nuclear option (Yoshihara, 2008, p.37). This is a considerable departure from the use of a nuclear program as a nuclear deterrent, and should perhaps be considered in the calculus of ascertaining Chinese nuclear doctrine and posture. It should be considered, perhaps, that Beijing does not share the Western perception of the disutility of nuclear weapons (used only to deter their use), and perhaps, instead, sees its arsenal as a tool of coercion (Tkacik, 201,4 p.162).

Conversely, Beijing has been prone to entering various binding agreements vis-à-vis arms control and bans on nuclear testing (Bleek, 2004, p.1), sending a conflicting message. Though this is likely intentional on the part of China, which is known to deliberately be the least transparent of declared nuclear powers (Bleek, 2004, p.1), and has traditionally placed significant emphasis on secrecy and deception regarding its capabilities (Bleek, 2004, p.1). It is suggested that nuclear ambiguity is perhaps an optimal strategy given the overwhelmingly vast disparity between the known capabilities of the People’s Republic and those of the Russian Federation and the United States (Bleek, 200,4 p.1). To this end, Deng Xiaoping has said that Beijing just allows others to guess, and that the act of guessing, uncertainty is its own form of deterrent, suggesting that not knowing the absolute numbers impairs a rival’s confidence in its ability to deprive Beijing of its retaliatory capability (Bleek, 2004, p.2).

It is suggested that Chinese doctrinal issues are tightly intertwined with the modernisation of Chinese forces, perhaps indicating that declared doctrine changes as their corresponding capabilities change. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists points out that Chinese national defence was ranked behind agriculture, industry, and science and technology, that is to say, last among the priorities of modernisation. They also offer that China lagged far behind the soviet and American programs due to its adherence to Maoist people’s war doctrine and guerrilla principles, and that there has already been a significant internal doctrinal change from deterrence by mounting costs via the denial of ultimate victory, to one of deterrence by threat of retaliation (Simon, 1988, p.46). Given the statements by military officials, it can be assumed that another such change may be on the horizon.

What are China’s nuclear capabilities?

There is little concrete information available about the precise numbers when it comes to China’s nuclear arsenal, as evidenced by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ annual reports on Chinese nuclear forces, nevertheless, the 2015 report states that China is the only one of the original declared nuclear powers to be quantitatively increasing the size of its arsenal (Kistensen, 2015 p.77), from 200 deployed warheads in 2006 (Jristensen, 2006 p.62) to 260 in 2015 (Kristensen, 2015 p.78). While in absolute terms, this may not seem like much, in relative terms, an expansion of 30% over nine years is substantial; in terms of percentages, it is comparable to Cold War expansions of the two superpowers. This is a period where the United States and Russian Federation have reduced their respective stockpiles by a similar margin (Kristensen, 2010, pp.81-2). Over the same period, China has increased its stockpile of long-range nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States from ~20 to ~65, and its Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) stockpile from 12 to 48 with the introduction of the Jin-class SSBN, and increases of 300% and 400%, respectively.

PLAN Type 094 Jin-class SSBN (scmp.com)

The bulk of China’s land-based deterrent consists of relatively inaccurate delivery systems and must therefore be mounted with large, multi-megaton warheads, making the use of MIRVs impractical. The missiles are liquid, rather than solid-fuel, extending firing time, rendering a launch on warning or launch while under attack posture impractical. Their survivability has been increased by storing them in underground caves, separate from their warheads, and erecting empty decoy silos, which is consistent with a minimal deterrence approach. However, Beijing’s considerable effort in developing non-strategic nuclear assets which may be used in counterforce roles against US positions in Asia-Pacific, cannot be considered a minimal approach (Bleek, 2004, p.4).

A theory has been put forward that China’s nuclear forces can be viewed as multi-tiered, with strategic forces being positioned as a second-strike minimal deterrent, and non-strategic assets geared for a more offensive, albeit limited manner (Bleek, 2004, p.4). It is posited that the inaccuracy of China’s strategic assets is the result of technological limitations, rather than by design or due to doctrinal constraints. This is perhaps due to the visibility of ICBMs, and the tendency of foreign media to focus on them at the expense of hundreds of delivery systems that comprise the naval and aerial components of the Chinese arsenal (Bleek, 2004, p.5). The small size of its most visible nuclear assets has spared China a costly arms race (Weitz, 2015) while allowing it to beef up its strategic forces at its leisure. That all being said, the aerial component of the triad is centred on the H-6, introduced in 1959, a derivative of the long obsolete Soviet Tu-16 “Badger” supplemented by nuclear-capable Su-30 fighter bombers purchased from the Russian Federation, indicating an inability on China’s part to produce its own indigenous strategic bombers. Beijing’s reliance on Russian IL-76 aircraft as its main military transport and modified versions of the same for AWACS suggests an incapacity to build indigenous wide-body military aircraft in general. The main emphasis seems to be placed on the development of the Jin-class ballistic missile submarine.

Some analysts argue that China’s large stockpiles of fissile material, the acquisition of which tends to be the most significant and challenging step in the development of nuclear weapons, allow for Beijing to increase the size of its arsenal several times over, and that its seeming reluctance to do so signifies doctrinal constraints (Bleek, 2008, p.4). This stance, however, ignores the significant build-up (in relative terms) mentioned above. It also assumes a utility in developing large quantities of arguably ineffective assets. In brief, China could double or triple the number of land-based warheads it currently has deployed, but is there a point, given how far behind other great powers it lags? It is also argued that the development of the Chinese space program refutes any argument of technological limitations or inadequacies (Bleek, 200,8 p.4). However, this argument makes a false equivocation between space rockets and nuclear delivery systems. It can equally be argued that if technology were not a limiting factor, then China would have solid-fuel delivery systems and miniaturised, MIRV-capable warheads, neither of which is strictly needed in the context of a space program.

China’s booming economy is also cited as an indicator of doctrinal constraints on its nuclear forces structure (Bleek, 2008, p.4), but one cannot simply buy industrial capacity and know-how. In fact, its booming economy may be a factor in the slow modernisation of China’s nuclear forces, as mentioned earlier, national defence (and therefore nuclear forces) were ranked lowest on the list of modernisation priorities, after economic, industrial, and technological priorities. The argument is a little backwards, in that while a strong economy and technological research and development certainly facilitate the development of an advanced deterrent, China was not always in this position. Looking at its current position to explain its historical posture is spurious at best. China is in a strong position now, having invested heavily in its technology sector, and as such, has expanded its nuclear arsenal considerably over the last decade, as well as modernised its SSBN fleet — though not the ground and aerial arms of the triad.

Furthermore, these arguments don’t take into account the structural realities of the Chinese military industrial complex. For instance, in 1980, 20% of the Chinese defence industry production consisted of manufacturing civilian products. This number soared to 30% by 1990. Some suggest that the limited liberalisation of the Chinese economy has rendered some “infatuated” with the profit potential of targeting the consumer market, and that it may prove difficult to re-focus that production capacity toward military aims. Additionally, the third line of defence and research installations were moved out of major cities and to remote, rural areas to increase their survivability, consuming a non-trivial amount of investment capital, as well as rendering these facilities vulnerable to transportation and communication bottlenecks, making it difficult and costly to reintegrate them into the economic mainstream (Kristensen, 1988, p.47). It is reasonable to argue that China’s strategic forces and military industrial complex were not immediately reintegrated into the economic mainstream and did not fully benefit from China’s vastly increased economic clout until well into China’s economic boom. Once again, and this cannot be restated enough, national defence was, after all, listed behind everything else in the modernisation roadmap. There is evidence to suggest that a number of these technological, industrial, and economic limitations are being addressed and overcome, e.g. the SSBN and stealth fighter programs, as well as the development of the MIRV-capable delivery platforms, though not completely, e.g. the continued reliance on the Tu-16-derived H-6 as the core of its aerial deterrent.

There are also geographic considerations to take into account. On one hand, China has leveraged its vast and mountainous terrain to increase the survivability of its land-based forces, which have historically, and continue to (insofar as we know) make up the bulk of the Chinese arsenal. There are, however, less beneficial considerations, for instance, the relative shallowness of China’s littoral waters, and the lack of clear, unrestricted access to the Pacific, which would render its relatively noisy (relative to modern, or even Cold War era Soviet/Russian/Indian, American/British, and French counterparts). SSBN bastions are vulnerable without a safe haven. To this end, Beijing appears to be attempting to alter its geographical constraints to a more favourable configuration, judging by its assertive policy in the South China Sea (SCS), regarding its expanded exclusive economic zone and “planting” of artificial islands. Breaching the first island chain would, to an extent, grant Beijing the unfettered access to the Pacific depths that it previously lacked

South China Sea depth map in meters (https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-South-China-Sea-and-its-neighbouring-area-The-contours-show-the-water-depth_fig4_367117621)

This is a stark distinction between China, which has historically neglected its undersea deterrent — other than Soviet-procured Golf-class subs, and the one Xia-class — compared to the other nuclear powers. France and England had unrestricted access to the ocean, which they patrol routinely. India’s lone Akula-class, leased from the Russian Federation, patrols the Indian Ocean in relative safety. The United States has unfettered access to two oceans, and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation have leveraged the safe, remote depths of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Arctic Ocean. China’s lack of such favourable geographic conditions may explain its neglected SSBN development. However, its current focus on developing an advanced undersea deterrent, especially when viewed in the context of its SCS policy, is perhaps concerning, be it because of revisionist clinging to the restoration of Qing China’s spheres of influence, as a means to compensate for its inability to produce and indigenous long-range strategic bomber, or for the purpose of establishing itself as a regional hegemon, in any case, a credible and effective undersea deterrent arguably necessitates more forgiving geographical conditions, which in turn, necessitates a more assertive, revisionist policy in the SCS; the political ramifications of such a policy, in turn, necessitate an effective deterrent. It can perhaps be argued that China did not, until recently, possess the means to pursue such policies, and as such, did not place as much emphasis on its SSBN program.

PLAN Type 092 Changzheng 6 (Xia-class) in 2002 (navypedia.org)

There is evidence suggesting a revisionist flavour to China’s modernisation program, that China is either paving the way for, or already engaged in a transition to a more assertive strategy, which can be used as a tool for political coercion, first-strike capability, and perhaps even eventual nuclear parity with the United States and Russian Federation (Tkacik, 2014, p.162). Definite numbers for China’s delivery systems or warheads and concrete facts regarding their specifications are not easy to come by, and are mainly built on supposition and conjecture, and guesses at policy and doctrine tend to be made from the Western vantage point, where nuclear weapons exist purely as a deterrent. This may not be the case where Beijing is concerned, and it may be prudent not to make such assumptions when attempting to ascertain Chinese policy and capabilities.

China, today, with its economic girth, trade, and creditor status, is granted a degree of economic dominance reminiscent of the United States, post World War II, or the British Empire in the late 19th century. China looks increasingly like a potential future global hegemon (Tkacik, 2014 p.164), to this effect, Beijing has, according to Pacific Command Commander Admiral Timothy Keating, suggested that the Pacific be divided up into a Chinese sphere of influence in the fast, with China preparing for the possibility of conflict given American reluctance to cede even an inch of its domain (Tkacik, 2014 p165). This, and the scale of its modernisation program, are corroborated by the (relatively) dramatic increase in Chinese military expenditures, which by some estimates double or even triple the Russian Federation’s military budget. This behaviour can be interpreted as Beijing seeing itself as a great power and at least an equal to Washington.

There are, however, arguments that China’s arsenal expansion has historically been slow and minimal, and will continue to be (Tkacik, 2014, pp.166-7), but there are factors that existed before that do not now. The bipolar nature of the Cold War had relegated China, by no means the economic giant it is today, to second-rate power status, and various political, economic, industrial, and technological factors created a vast capabilities gap that the China of the ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s, and even ‘80s and ‘90s couldn’t hope to close. This is no longer the case. In terms of Purchasing Power Parity, China has already surpassed both the United States and the European Union in terms of sheer economic size. In absolute terms of nominal GDP, it is closer to the US than Imperial Japan was at the onset of the Second World War; it has, to a significant degree, modernised its infrastructure and continues to do so. Additionally, we are no longer in either a bipolar or even unipolar international system. The system is transitioning into a state of multipolarity, with China, a re-emerging Russia, and an emerging India on the periphery. Beijing is no longer a second-rate power; it is no longer relegated to having to pick a side, and the political implications of a potential breakout are less severe than they once were.

That considered, China finds itself in a position more similar to the Soviet Union in the early post-war period than to any other nuclear power; a rising superpower vying to hold its own and perhaps even displace the reigning hegemon, it is likely to follow a path similar to that of Moscow, rather than one similar to Paris or London, which had all but abandoned great power ambitions and could safely rely on NATO and America’s nuclear umbrella, or India which shows little, if any sign of possessing a revisionist worldview or hegemonic ambitions.

Findings.

Few details are known about China’s nuclear capabilities or doctrine; however, certain indicators can be examined as a whole to make some assumptions. It may have, once upon a time, held a doctrine of minimal deterrence with completely defensive intentions, but it is unclear if its historical minimal deterrent was such due to doctrinal and political constraints, or whether it had been due to geographical, industrial, economic, political, and military limitations. That China has in the past few decades, made great strides in relaxing, if not outright overcoming, in several cases, those limitations, and that the result is a relatively rapid modernisation and expansion of its arsenal suggests the latter. In several cases, these limitations still apply, notably the political ramifications of rapid expansion, its inability to develop an indigenous long-range strategic bomber program, and geographical constraints; however, it appears to be working to overcome these as well.

Beijing appears to have learnt from the mistakes of Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, as it is not needlessly hasty to mount a hegemonic challenge; it is so slow, and arguably cautious in fact, that such ambitions can only be speculated, with a reasonable degree of confidence. Nevertheless, its present behaviour, especially in the context of its assertive policy in the SCS, and its international initiatives position it as a potential regional hegemon and the third horse in a tri-polar configuration of the international system, if not an outright hegemonic challenger to Washington, Overall, while admittedly speculative, its behaviour suggests a transition toward a more aggressive nuclear doctrine, reflecting its increasing capabilities, and quite possibly an eventual nuclear breakout. Its foreign policy, at the very least, appears to necessitate a more robust deterrent to avoid direct conflict.

That being said, there still appears to be a reactionary element to its nuclear modernisation and expansion, a less belligerent stance toward China on Washington’s part, or at least a less overt containment initiative may forestall the transition, though that may also be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Great powers don’t have the best historical record on keeping promises. There is a danger that the point of critical mass has already been crossed, and while this may not be reflected in terms of conventional and nuclear capabilities, Beijing is already in the process of asserting itself as a global power.

In a more general sense, it is difficult to determine whether doctrine is the limiting factor to a state’s nuclear capabilities or whether a state’s capabilities are what determine its doctrine and nuclear strategy. Either hypothesis depends heavily on the political context the state finds itself in; if there isn’t a political need for a large arsenal, there isn’t one, though this has yet to be tested in the context of a great power. Neither France for Britain are great power (anymore), neither has a large arsenal, both apply a doctrine of minimal deterrence, though in both cases, their indigenous deterrent is unnecessary given their inclusion under the NATO/US nuclear umbrella. As well, neither seems to have great power ambitions.

Both the Russian Federation and the United States have massive arsenals, full triads, and extensive capabilities, and these are the only states, at present, with the ability to maintain such arsenals. Their doctrines are most certainly shaped both by their capabilities and by each other’s. China is a particularly interesting test case because it couldn’t historically field an arsenal fir for much beyond minimal deterrence; its posture becomes more assertive as its capabilities improve, but the doctrine itself is vague and general enough to border on meaningless. I would posit that no state which has both the capability and political need for a large offensive arsenal and corresponding doctrine doesn’t have both in place. While states that are lacking one or the other have more defensive doctrines and corresponding arsenals. However, states with the means but not the need (France, Britain) have been reducing their stockpiles, while states that have the need (China, Pakistan, India) have the tendency to grow their arsenals as capabilities improve. I would posit, therefore, that while both the conventional wisdom and the alternate hypothesis have their merits. A more accurate conclusion would be that political need drives the development of nuclear capabilities, which in turn drives policy.

Policy implications and recommendations.

Beijing’s assertive policy in the South China Sea appears to be an attempt to create a more favourable geopolitical environment for itself. If it succeeds in securing unfettered access to the Pacific Ocean, or at least expanding its zone of influence to the first island chain, a breakout is likely. If a Chinese breakout is something to be prevented, then a policy of containment may be wise, and in order to do so, leveraging China’s dependence on the flow of goods, particularly energy through certain chokepoints (Malacca, Hormuz, Taiwan Straits) must be considered. A problem is that the current policy of dual-containment vis-à-vis Beijing and Moscow is counterproductive to this end. Forcing the two to deepen their ties and increasing pressure on Moscow’s interdependence in the energy sector with the EU may force it to turn eastwards, minimising Beijing’s vulnerability to blockades. As well, such a policy facilitates the transfer of advanced military technology from the Russian Federation to the People’s Republic of China; Su-30, S-300/400, the Liaoning and others have already been procured via Moscow. I would refer to Mackinder and Spykeman for more details on why pushing the two eastern powers together is probably short-sighted.

Building missile shields on China’s areas of interest is perhaps also a bad idea, which will only serve to prompt a security dilemma and arms race, this is especially dangerous as, unlike Moscow, Beijing is secretive about its modernisation and military development; we may not see the reaction to actions Beijing finds threatening until long after it is too late to reverse them. To that end, pushing Beijing’s buttons regarding Taiwan is very likely to trigger a response and may not be a prudent course of action. Ultimately, if containing China is a foreign policy priority, it may be prudent to avoid antagonising it outside of its SCS expansion. Preventing China from breaching the first island chain significantly reduces the efficacy of its SSBN program, and without a viable aerial arm to its triad, may prevent breakout altogether, at least until it develops an indigenous program. On the same token, driving a wedge between Beijing and Moscow can stand to work to slow the transfer of advanced military technology that would allow Beijing to fill gaps in its modernisation endeavour. The current China policy in Washington all but guarantees a Chinese breakout.

Bibliography

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Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. “CHINA&#39;S NEW UNDERSEA NUCLEAR DETERRENT Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities.” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 50 (Summer2008 2008): 31-38.Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Bleek, Philip C. 2004. “CHINA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE AT THE CROSSROADS: CREDIBLE MINIMUM VERSUS LIMITED DETERRENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT.” Kennedy School Review 5, 1-12. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Weitz, Richard. 2015. “New Advances Challenge Old Truths About China’s Nuclear Posture.” World Politics Review (Selective Content) 1. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Tkacik, Michael. 2014. “Chinese Nuclear Weapons Enhancements – Implications for Chinese Employment Policy.” Defence Studies 14, no. 2: 161-191. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

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Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2015. “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 71, no. 4: 77-84. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2006. “Chinese nuclear forces, 2006.” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 62, no. 3: 60-63. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen. 2010. “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010.&quot; Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 66, no. 4: 77-83. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “Chinese nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 64, no. 3: 42-44.Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost.

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Babiarz, Renny. 2015. The people’s nuclear weapon: Strategic culture and the development of china’s nuclear weapons program. Comparative Strategy 34 (5) (Nov): 422-46.

Fieldhouse, Richard. 1991. China’s mixed signals on nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47 (4) (05): 37-42.

Goldstein, Lyle J. 2003. When China was a ‘rogue state’: The impact of China’s nuclear weapons program on US-China relations during the 1960s. Journal of Contemporary China 12 (37) (11): 739.

Lewis, John W., and Xue Litai. 2012. Making China’s nuclear war plan. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68 (5) (09): 45-65.

17 photos of Poilievre.

5 full-page spreads.

Waited until after early voting was closed to release it.

(link)

tl;dr reads like it was put together at the last minute, promises a CPC government is unlikely to be able to deliver, breaching the charter of rights in the name of law and order. Slogans! And more slogans! $100 billion in deficit spending over 4 years. Photos of PP.

Bring it home, tax reform

”Within 60 days of forming government, we will launch a Tax Reform Task Force made up of farmers, builders, entrepreneurs, economists, and workers—not Ottawa insiders. Their job will be to deliver a simple, fair tax code that:

- Rewards work and saving.
- Closes loopholes for the wealthy and well-connected.
- Eliminates unnecessary red tape.
- Makes it easier for Canadians to file and understand their taxes.”

Right out of the gate, there’s some contradictory messaging in a considerable part of the critique about Mark Carney is that he ran a private investment firm and will govern policy in a way where he benefits from it, but yet, entrepreneurs, or in other words, the wealthy and well-connected who benefit from loopholes will help close those loopholes. At least he’s willing to let economists in on tax policy in addition to the populist nonsense. But more concerning is that these are campaign talking points; it isn’t policy, and there’s no expansion on how these goals will be achieved.

Fiscal Common Sense
Tax relief is only one side of the coin; spending discipline is the other. We'll ensure every dollar spent gets results and stops the runaway growth of government that leaves everyday Canadians behind. We will:

• Pass a one-for-one spending law. For every new dollar spent, an equal amount must be reduced.

• Cut red tape by 25% and bring in a two-for-one rule. We will reduce regulations by 25% within two years, and ensure going forward that two regulations are eliminated for every new one. We will also ensure that for every $1 of new administrative burden, $2 is removed. The Auditor General will be required to verify that we deliver on these commitments.

Point 1 and 2 contradict each other. Is it 1 for 1 or 2 for 1? Moreover, while removing two regulations for each new one might sound nice on paper, if you don’t think about it too much, which regulations does he have in mind for the chopping block? Has he given it any thought? Which services will be cut, which regulations will be eliminated?

Tables of the projected savings and expenses are featured near the end of this article (and at the end of the policy document).

“Unleash Canadian energy and resources”

is in some parts good, but in others, well, repealing the C-48 tanker ban basically throws BC and its indigenous communities under the bus for Alberta’s benefit. The catch is that while it is entirely under the federal government’s jurisdiction to repeal the tanker ban, it cannot build LNG terminals in BC without British Columbia’s cooperation. Antagonizing BC and indigenous communities in this way isn’t even necessary as there’s ample room to expand the southern routes, which BC is already amenable to, where the federal government already owns the pipelines, and where LNG terminals (such as in Kitimat) are already being built.

Repealing C-69 is not surprising, but is also unnecessary; it basically sacrifices the indigenous communities upon Alberta’s altar for no reason — it can be amended to bypass the red tape when not transiting through indigenous territories (and incentivise building around, rather than through these communities).

The point about fast-tracking B.C.’s LNG Canada Phase 2 and the GNL Québec LNG project is interesting in what it reveals. PetroChina has a 15% stake in LNG Canada Phase 2, which is fine, to be clear, just contradictory to all the electoral rhetoric regarding China and the LPC.

It’s also, in some respects, an empty promise and a nonsense claim. C-48 does not extend to LNG carriers, and Phase 2 is already approved; there’s no fast-tracking necessary, and Poilievre’s promise to approve it immediately betrays either incompetence on his part or some extra-dimensional chess move that involves currying votes by insulting Canadians’ intelligence.

It’s even more egregious where GNL is concerned. There is nothing to fast-track. The Quebec government rejected the project back in 2021. While there is talk about Quebec being amenable to resurrecting this project, it needs to be negotiated. This is perhaps why at the French leaders’ debate, Poilievre avoided answering the question of whether he’d try to impose pipeline projects on Quebec and indigenous communities if he failed to secure their consent. Trying to force the issue is federal overreach and almost certainly the trigger for another constitutional and unity crisis.

Even with by some accounts 70% public support in Quebec for pipeline projects, reviving the project requires clearing the concerns regarding environmental impacts and compatibility with Quebec’s energy transition territory. I can promise the CPC’s base in Alberta that imposing federal jurisdiction over energy projects is not a precedent they want to be setting, even if they don’t care about the constitutional crisis aspect of it.

To be clear, resource extraction and infrastructure projects are good, but these promises to fast track projects that are either already approved or dead are empty and nonsensical. Likewise, the implication of imposing projects on provinces and indigenous communities for Alberta’s sole benefit is a nonstarter. Works for securing the Albertan vote, but involves potentially making enemies of Quebec and British Columbia.

“Fixing our ports by streamlining regulations and permitting, reforming borrowing caps, preauthorizing future development zones, exploring container shipping on the Great Lakes, extending the shipping season at the Port of Churchill, and reviewing the hours of work regulations for smaller ports

What is being left out here is that to extend Churchill’s shipping season requires building an icebreaker fleet we don’t have, as Churchill is not a warm water port, it also requires building considerable infrastructure through permafrost and wilderness. Both are costly endeavours, which do not appear to be costed in what is supposed to be a costed platform document.

On crime: A few things stand out here.

The “three strikes” proposal (three offenses then, a mandatory minimum 10-year sentence with conditions for release) is likely a constitutional debacle waiting to happen. The Supreme Court has already stuck down mandatory minimum sentences that are Grossly disproportionate to the crime (R v. Bissonnette (2022)) This also applies to life sentences. R v. Lloyd (2016), R v. Nur (2015), and R v. Boudreault (2018) also apply here. Quite a few supreme court decisions also have a thing or three to say about “no bail, parole, house arrest, or probation.”, as well, the restrictions on release come into opposition with several sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

”Jail not bail” also contravenes several sections of the charter, and as this is a recurring theme, same for the pledge to eliminate tent cities, which is particularly egregious when taken in contrast with the emphasis on affordable housing — if we’re to take the Conservative Leader at his word, Canadians deserve affordable housing, unless they’re homeless, in which case, they have no constitutional rights.

I’m all for cutting crime, but brazen abuse of the charter of rights and freedoms isn’t the way to to do it.

The military and border security

No major objections here, other than the pledge to “fix the CAF’s recruiting crisis by increasing the reserve force to 30,000 and the regular force to 71,000 within 18 months” this doesn’t even make sense, the recruiting problem means the CAf is having problems recruiting, just handwaving that they’ll fix it by increasing the numbers without telling us how, or how they’ll incentivise enlistment is just saying “we’ll fixc it by fixing it”. It doesn’t mean anything.

“Acquire two new heavy icebreakers for the Royal Canadian Navy, in addition to the two new icebreakers being delivered to the Coast Guard, for a total of four new icebreakers. • Build a new Arctic naval base in Churchill, Manitoba. This will serve as a base of operations for Canada’s new polar icebreakers and will allow the Port of Churchill to sustain a continuous commercial shipping season.”

This section should have been in the above section about Churchill. The document repeats itself a lot, it’s poorly structured, almost like it was thrown together at the last minute.

I like the idea of deploying military to secure the border, I’d proposed this in as a malicious compliance in response to President Trump’s demand for increased military spending and border security.

On Foreign Policy.

“Continue to strongly support Ukraine’s war to defend itself against Putin’s illegal invasion, including by sending Ukraine $22 billion in frozen Russian assets, and by always recognizing the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine’s territory.”

This $22 billion figure appears to be based on an early pre-sanctions estimate of Russian reserves in Canadian holdings, which has not been identified or located.

According to the RCMP, considerably less has actually been frozen. The platform promises to give something we don’t have.

To be clear, I’m not opposed to or for funding Ukraine; a case can be made either way, and it makes sense to do so given the shared desire of all parties to step up within NATO while Washington steps back. I am however, in favour of not promising things that are beyond our capability to deliver on the count of a candidate apparently getting their information from social media.

Also.
”Recognize the legitimate winner of Venezuela’s election. A Conservative government will recognize Edmundo González as the winner of the 2024 election in Venezuela and as Venezuela’s rightful President.”

lol?

Quebec Policy

A lot of flowery words about respecting this and acknowledging that.

”Anti-Woke ideology: A Conservative government will put an end to the imposition of the Woke ideology in the federal public service and in the allocation of federal funds for university research.”

really curious about why this is in the Quebec policy section. Here’s a better idea, leave it for Quebec to decide what research is funded or isn’t, and keep the fed’s nose our of our affairs, in the spirit of “respecting Quebec’s autonomy”.

Finally we get to the costing tables at the very end, these cost and savings estimates ideally should have been included alongside the bullspoints throughout the document, but it isn’t surprising as the whole thing feels like it was slapped together haphazardly at the last minute (probably why it missed the early voting window).

This table is curious, as the major source of revenue is the tariff response that all parties are promising, because it’s already in effect. The long and the short of it is that there’s a projected $100 billion deficit over 4 years, we could nix the tax breaks and funnel the resulting surplus into paying down the debt and using the resulting savings on interests payments to fund, granted, much lesser tax cuts, but alas, why do that when you can add $100 billion to the debt instead? Fiscal responsibility and common sense, after all!

Policyalternatives.ca breaks down the three major parties’ tax breaks as follows:

Essentially, despite the “boots not suits” and rhetorically pandering to the “average Canadian” and working class, while the bulk of the benefit from these breaks goes to the richest 30%. In fact, the Canadians who need relief the most — those living under the poverty line stand to get all of $25 from these proposals, again, from policyalternatives:

First, a brief overview of the German electoral system:

Germany uses a system of proportional representation. The country is …

Read more

and the link to the interview

There are a number is really goofy assumptions in here. 1. Break-even costs aren't the be-all-end-all. 2. The Albertan budget requires a $72 barrel to break even, despite lower costs for some of the wells themselves (https://cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/bakx-wti-wcs-alberta-budget-oil-1.7087855…). 3. Russian budget assumes a $70 barrel, not 80-90. 4. Only a portion of US drilling projects have a breakeven at 40, and that's mainly extant wells, with new ones being much higher. 5. Mexico's breakeven cost is about $70-75/bbl This US/Canada/Mexico energy superpower talk is fantasy, it would require substantial subsidies to prevent much of it being forced out of the market.

The US is already at record production enabled in no small part by OPEC+ cutting production to stabilize prices. Driving prices down to sub-40 isn't sustainable as at, let's say 30/bbl, only about 25% of US, RU, and CA wells are profitable, 35%-ish for Mexico. Kazakhstan and Qatar come out winners in the non-OPEC camp, but no one else is at or above 50% of their wells being profitable, as mentioned above, there are other factors than pure breakeven point.

Conversely, all of OPEC remains largely in the black (though only about 30% of Venezuela's wells' breakeven point is below 30/bbl.

So while the US is currently gaining market share, and OPEC+ trading market share for price stability, this reverses when the prices get low enough, and only OPEC can produce profitably. $50/bbl is perhaps the most optimal price point, yes, Russia has about 60% of its sites break even well below the price, but it forces it to consider levying tax hikes to compensate for lost revenues, (assuming the Ruble doesn't retain most of its domestic purchasing power, that is) but it also keeps non-OPEC competitive with OPEC, at least on paper (see, again, the Alberta example).

. This underlines an alarming trend among the policy elite boomers, an abject lack of creativity in defaulting to "we'll do the same as we did in the Cold War regardless of changing circumstances". Yes, this hurts Russia, but Russia isn't a rentier state. While the taxes on the profits from the energy sector feed about 50% of the federal budget, this is done in exchange for a ludicrously low fixed tax rate on everything else. In a pinch, they can increase taxes to compensate. It also hurts the oil industry in the US and allied states (Canada, Mexico, mainly)

This is a flawed argument, as the motivation is retrocausal, and requires breaking linear time for it to work. The proposed Casus Belli occurs after, not before, the fighting begins.

Here is a brief, non-exhaustive timeline of the leadup to the Second Chechen War:

• 16 November 1996. A bomb goes off in a housing complex for Russian border guards in Kaspiysk, Dagestan Republic, Russia. 68 dead.

• 23 April 1997, a Bomb goes off in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, Russia, at a train station, killing 3.

• 28 May 1997, another bombing at a train station in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Krai, Russia.

• 22 December 1997, Dagestani militants along with Chechen warlord, Ibn al-Khattab raid the base of the 136th Motor Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army in Buynaksk, Dagestan Republic, Russia.

• 1997, Chechen elections bring separatist Aslan Mashadov to power.

• March 1999, General Gennady Shpigun, Moscow's envoy to Chechnya is kidnapped at the Grozny airport (found dead the following year).

• 7 March Interior Minister Stepashin calls for the invasion of Chechnya, overridden by Prime Minister Primakov. The decision was made that day, however. We'll come back to Stepashin in a bit.

• May 1999, Russia closes its borders with Chechnya.

• 18 June 1999, 7 Russian servicemen were killed in an attack on a Russian border guard post in Dagestan.

• 29 July 1999, Russian Interior Ministry troops destroy a Chechen border post and capture a strategic road.

• In the summer of 1999, Chechen government official Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev allegedly alerted FSB director Vladimir Putin of an imminent invasion of Dagestan.

• 4 August 1999, Russian MVD servicemen were killed in a border clash with a group of fighters led by Kebedov.

• 7 August 1999, Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab lead two detachments of roughly 2,000 Chechen, Dagestani, Arab, and other Mujahideen and Wahhabi militants from Chechnya into the Republic of Dagestan (in Russia).

  It warrants spelling out here, that this is an act of war, of course, and marks the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

• Around this time, Stepashin, now Prime Minister, actively called for a military campaign against Chechen Separatists.

• 9 August 1999, 6 servicemen were kidnapped in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, Russia. Putin replaces Stepashin as Prime Minister.

• 22 August 1999, 10 Russian policemen were killed by an anti-tank mine in North Ossetia, Russia. At this point, the Russian Armed Forces are engaged in relieving the Dagestani resistance (civilian militias mainly).

• 23 August 1999, First combat deployment of T-90 main battle tanks.

• 4 September 1999, Russian Federal forces took out the last Chechen holdouts in the Kadar region. A car bomb destroys military housing in Buynaksk, Dagestan killing 68.

• 5 September 1999 Chechens launch a second invasion of the Novolakskoye region of Dagestan. Several Russian and Dagestani troops are executed during the capture of Tukhchar. Intense fighting until...

• 9 September 1999, the first Moscow apartment bombing.

Despite a little over a month of heavy fighting, including two invasions of the Russian Federation, this, we are expected to believe, is the purported Casus Belli.

• On 12 September 1999, federal and volunteer forces force the Islamists back to Chechnya.

• On 13 September 1999, the last of the captured villages were liberated, and RuAF conducted air strikes inside the Chechen Republic.

• 13 September 1999, second Moscow apartment bombing,

  This, we are led to believe is the Casus Belli, despite a month and a half of intense fighting, including two repelled invasions of the Russian Federation’s Dagestan Republic, incursions into the Chechen Republic, air strikes within the territory of the Chechen Republic, and 3 years of terror bombings.

While the circumstances of the Apartment bombings were indeed murky, that isn’t the subject of discussion here, rather the apartment bombings as a false flag aimed at manufacturing a Casus Beli for a war that had begun a month prior.

The argument is fundamentally one of 3 years of terror bombings and two invasion attempts that clearly, obviously, and empirically were used to justify a military response were insufficient grounds to justify the military response that they were used to justify. Instead, a false flag was required a month after the war had already started. If that sounds absurd, it’s because it is. If your motive requires time travel or breaks causality, it’s a bad argument, plain and simple.